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This article summarizes the Quantum Bayesian [1–7] point
of view of quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on the
view’s outer edges—dubbed QBism.1 QBism has its roots
in personalist Bayesian probability theory, is crucially depen-
dent upon the tools of quantum information theory, and most
recently, has set out to investigate whether the physical world
might be of a type sketched by some false-started philosophies
of 100 years ago (pragmatism, pluralism, nonreductionism,
and meliorism). Beyond conceptual issues, work at Perimeter
Institute is focussed on the hard technical problem of finding
a good representation of quantum mechanics purely in terms
of probabilities, without amplitudes or Hilbert-space opera-
tors. The best candidate representation involves a mysterious
entity called a symmetric informationally complete quantum
measurement. Contemplation of it gives a way of thinking
of the Born Rule as an addition to the rules of probabil-
ity theory, applicable when an agent considers gambling on
the consequences of his interactions with a newly recognized
universal capacity: dimension (formerly Hilbert-space dimen-
sion). (The word “capacity” should conjure up an image of
something like gravitational mass—a body’s mass measures
its capacity to attract other bodies. With hindsight one can
say that the founders of quantum mechanics discovered an-
other universal capacity, “dimension.”) The article ends by
showing that the egocentric elements in QBism represent no
impediment to pursuing quantum cosmology and outlining
some directions for future work.
I. A FEARED DISEASE
The start of the new decade has just passed and so has
the media frenzy over the H1N1 flu pandemic. Both are
welcome events. Yet, as misplaced as the latter turned
out to be, it did serve to remind us of a basic truth: That
a healthy body can be stricken with a fatal disease which
1Quantum Bayesianism, as it is called in the literature, usu-
ally refers to a point of view on quantum states originally
developed by C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. The
present work, however, goes far beyond those statements in
the metaphysical conclusions it draws—so much so that the
author cannot comfortably attribute the thoughts herein to
the triumvirate as a whole. Thus, the term QBism to mark
some distinction from the known common ground of Quantum
Bayesianism. Needless to say, the author takes sole responsi-
bility for any inanities herein.
to outward appearances is nearly identical to a common
yearly annoyance. There are lessons here for quantum
mechanics. In the history of physics, there has never
been a healthier body than quantum theory; no theory
has ever been more all-encompassing or more powerful.
Its calculations are relevant at every scale of physical ex-
perience, from subnuclear particles, to table-top lasers, to
the cores of neutron stars and even the first three min-
utes of the universe. Yet since its founding days, many
physicists have feared that quantum theory’s common
annoyance—the continuing feeling that something at the
bottom of it does not make sense—may one day turn out
to be the symptom of something fatal.
There is something about quantum theory that is dif-
ferent in character from any physical theory posed before.
To put a finger on it, the issue is this: The basic state-
ment of the theory—the one we have all learned from our
textbooks—seems to rely on terms our intuitions balk at
as having any place in a fundamental description of re-
ality. The notions of “observer” and “measurement” are
taken as primitive, the very starting point of the theory.
This is an unsettling situation! Shouldn’t physics be talk-
ing about what is before it starts talking about what will
be seen and who will see it? Perhaps no one has put the
point more forcefully than John Stewart Bell [8]:
What exactly qualifies some physical systems to
play the role of ‘measurer’? Was the wavefunc-
tion of the world waiting to jump for thousands of
millions of years until a single-celled living crea-
ture appeared? Or did it have to wait a little
longer, for some better qualified system . . . with
a PhD?
One sometimes gets the feeling—and this is what unifies
many a diverse quantum foundations researcher—that
until this issue is settled, fundamental physical theory
has no right to move on. Worse yet, that to the extent it
does move on, it does so only as the carrier of something
insidious, something that will eventually cause the whole
organism to stop in its tracks. “Dark matter and dark
energy? Might these be the first symptoms of something
systemic? Might the problem be much deeper than get-
ting our quantum fields wrong?” — This is the kind of
fear at work here.
So the field of quantum foundations is not unfounded;
it is absolutely vital to physics as a whole. But what con-
stitutes “progress” in quantum foundations? How would
one know progress if one saw it? Through the years, it
seems the most popular strategy has taken its cue (even
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if only subliminally) from the tenor of John Bell’s quote:
The idea has been to remove the observer from the theory
just as quickly as possible, and with surgical precision. In
practice this has generally meant to keep the mathemat-
ical structure of quantum theory as it stands (complex
Hilbert spaces, operators, tensor products, etc.), but, by
hook or crook, find a way to tell a story about the math-
ematical symbols that involves no observers at all.
In short, the strategy has been to reify or objectify
all the mathematical symbols of the theory and then
explore whatever comes of the move. Three examples
suffice to give a feel: In the de Broglie – Bohm “pilot
wave” version of quantum theory, there are no funda-
mental measurements, only “particles” flying around in
a 3N -dimensional configuration space, pushed around by
a wave function regarded as a real physical field in that
space. In “spontaneous collapse” versions, systems are
endowed with quantum states that generally evolve uni-
tarily, but from time-to-time collapse without any need
for measurement. In Everettian or “many-worlds” quan-
tum mechanics, it is only the world as a whole—they
call it a multiverse—that is really endowed with an in-
trinsic quantum state, and that quantum state evolves
deterministically, with only an illusion from the inside of
probabilistic “branching.”
The trouble with all these interpretations as quick fixes
for Bell’s hard-edged remark is that they look to be just
that, really quick fixes. They look to be interpretive
strategies hardly compelled by the particular details of
the quantum formalism, giving only more or less arbi-
trary appendages to it. This already explains in part
why we have been able to exhibit three such different
strategies, but it is worse: Each of these strategies gives
rise to its own set of incredibilities—ones which, if one
were endowed with Bell’s gift for the pen, one could make
look just as silly. Pilot-wave theories, for instance, give
instantaneous action at a distance, but not actions that
can be harnessed to send detectable signals. If so, then
what a delicately balanced high-wire act nature presents
us with. Or take the Everettians. Their world purports
to have no observers, but then it has no probabilities ei-
ther. What are we then to do with the Born Rule for
calculating quantum probabilities? Throw it away and
say it never mattered? It is true that quite an effort
has been made by the Everettians to rederive the rule
from decision theory. Of those who take the point seri-
ously, some think it works [9], some don’t [10]. But out-
side the sprachspiel who could ever believe? No amount
of sophistry can make “decision” anything other than a
hollow concept in a predetermined world.
II. QUANTUM STATES DO NOT EXIST
There is another lesson from the H1N1 virus. It is
that sometimes immunities can be found in unexpected
populations. To some perplexity, it seems that people
over 65—a population usually more susceptible to fatali-
ties with seasonal flu—fare better than younger folk with
H1N1. No one knows exactly why, but the leading the-
ory is that the older population, in its years of other
exposures, has developed various latent antibodies. The
antibodies are not perfect, but they are a start. And so
it may be for quantum foundations.
Here, the latent antibody is the concept of information,
and the perfected vaccine, we believe, will arise in part
from the theory of single-case, personal probabilities—
the branch of probability theory called Bayesianism.
Symbolically, the older population corresponds to some
of the very founders of quantum theory (Heisenberg,
Pauli, Einstein)2 and some of the younger disciples of
the Copenhagen school (Rudolf Peierls, John Archibald
Wheeler, Asher Peres), who, though they disagreed on
many details of the vision—Whose information? Infor-
mation about what?—were unified on one point: That
quantum states are not something out there, in the exter-
nal world, but instead are expressions of information. Be-
fore there were people using quantum theory as a branch
of physics, before they were calculating neutron-capture
cross-sections for uranium and working on all the other
practical problems the theory suggests, there were no
quantum states. The world may be full of stuff and things
of all kinds, but among all the stuff and all the things,
there is no unique, observer-independent, quantum-state
kind of stuff.
The immediate payoff of this strategy is that it elimi-
nates the conundrums arising in the various objectified-
state interpretations. A paraphrase of a quote by James
Hartle makes the point decisively [11]:
A quantum-mechanical state being a sum-
mary of the observers’ information about an indi-
vidual physical system changes both by dynam-
ical laws, and whenever the observer acquires
new information about the system through the
process of measurement. The existence of two
laws for the evolution of the state vector becomes
problematical only if it is believed that the state
vector is an objective property of the system. If,
however, the state of a system is defined as a
list of [experimental] propositions together with
their [probabilities of occurrence], it is not sur-
prising that after a measurement the state must
be changed to be in accord with [any] new infor-
mation. The “reduction of the wave packet” does
take place in the consciousness of the observer,
not because of any unique physical process which
takes place there, but only because the state is
a construct of the observer and not an objective
property of the physical system.
2I feel guilty not mentioning Bohr here, but he so rarely
talked directly about quantum states that I fear anything I
say would be misrepresentative.
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It says that the real substance of Bell’s fear is just that,
the fear itself. To succumb to it is to block the way to
understanding the theory on its own terms. Moreover,
the shriller notes of Bell’s rhetoric are the least of the
worries: The universe didn’t have to wait billions of years
to collapse its first wave function—wave functions are not
part of the observer-independent world.
But this much of the solution is an elderly and some-
what ineffective antibody. Its presence is mostly a call
for more clinical research. Luckily the days for this are
ripe, and it has much to do with the development of the
field of quantum information theory in the last 15 years—
that is, the multidisciplinary field that has brought about
quantum cryptography, quantum teleportation, and will
one day bring about full-blown quantum computation.
Terminology can say it all: A practitioner in this field,
whether she has ever thought an ounce about quantum
foundations, is just as likely to say “quantum informa-
tion” as “quantum state” when talking of any |ψ〉. “What
does the quantum teleportation protocol do?” A now
completely standard answer would be: “It transfers quan-
tum information from Alice’s site to Bob’s.” What we
have here is a change of mindset [6].
What the facts and figures, protocols and theorems
of quantum information pound home is the idea that
quantum states look, act, and feel like information in the
technical sense of the word—the sense provided by prob-
ability theory and Shannon’s information theory. There
is no more beautiful demonstration of this than Robert
Spekkens’s “toy model” for mimicking various features of
quantum mechanics [12]. In that model, the “toys” are
each equipped with four possible mechanical configura-
tions; but the players, the manipulators of the toys, are
consistently impeded—for whatever reason!—from hav-
ing more than one bit of information about each toy’s
actual configuration. (Or a total of two bits for each two
toys, three bits for each three toys, and so on.) The only
things the players can know are their states of uncer-
tainty about the configurations. The wonderful thing is
that these states of uncertainty exhibit many of the char-
acteristics of quantum information: from the no-cloning
theorem to analogues of quantum teleportation, quantum
key distribution, entanglement monogamy, and even in-
terference in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. More than
two dozen quantum phenomena are reproduced qualita-
tively, and all the while one can always pinpoint the un-
derlying cause of the occurrence: The phenomena arise in
the uncertainties, never in the mechanical configurations.
It is the states of uncertainty that mimic the formal ap-
paratus of quantum theory, not the toys’ so-called ontic
states (states of reality).
What considerations like this tell the ψ-ontologists3—
3Not to be confused with Scientologists. This neologism was
coined by Chris Granade, a Perimeter Scholars International
i.e., those who to attempt to remove the observer
too quickly from quantum mechanics by giving quan-
tum states an unfounded ontic status—was well put by
Spekkens:
[A] proponent of the ontic view might argue that
the phenomena in question are not mysterious if
one abandons certain preconceived notions about
physical reality. The challenge we offer to such a
person is to present a few simple physical prin-
ciples by the light of which all of these phe-
nomena become conceptually intuitive (and not
merely mathematical consequences of the formal-
ism) within a framework wherein the quantum
state is an ontic state. Our impression is that this
challenge cannot be met. By contrast, a single
information-theoretic principle, which imposes a
constraint on the amount of knowledge one can
have about any system, is sufficient to derive all
of these phenomena in the context of a simple toy
theory . . .
The point is, far from being an appendage cheaply tacked
on to the theory, the idea of quantum states as informa-
tion has a simple unifying power that goes some way
toward explaining why the theory has the very mathe-
matical structure it does.4 By contrast, who could take
the many-worlds idea and derive any of the structure of
quantum theory out of it? This would be a bit like try-
ing to regrow a lizard from the tip of its chopped-off tail:
The Everettian conception never purported to be more
than a reaction to the formalism in the first place.
There are, however, aspects of Bell’s challenge (or at
least the mindset behind it), that remain a worry. And
upon these, all could still topple. There are the old
questions of Whose information? and Information about
what?—these certainly must be addressed before any vac-
cination can be declared a success. It must also be settled
whether quantum theory is obligated to give a criterion
for what counts as an observer. Finally, because no one
wants to give up on physics, we must tackle head-on the
most crucial question of all: If quantum states are not
part of the stuff of the world, then what is? What sort
student at Perimeter Institute, and brought to the author’s
attention by R. W. Spekkens, who pounced on it for its beau-
tiful subtlety.
4We say “goes some way toward” because, though the toy
model makes about as compelling a case as we have ever seen
that quantum states are states of information (an extremely
valuable step forward), it gravely departs from quantum the-
ory in other aspects. For instance, by its nature, it can give no
Bell inequality violations or analogues of the Kochen-Specker
noncolorability theorems. Later sections of this paper will in-
dicate that the cause of the deficit is that the toy model differs
crucially from quantum theory in its answer to the question
Information about what?
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of stuff does quantum mechanics say the world is made
of?
Good immunology does not come easily. But this much
is sure: The glaringly obvious (that a large part of quan-
tum theory, the central part in fact, is about information)
should not be abandoned rashly: To do so is to lose grip
of the theory as it is applied in practice, with no bet-
ter grasp of reality in return. If on the other hand, one
holds fast to the central point about information, initially
frightening though it may be, one may still be able to re-
construct a picture of reality from the unfocused edge of
vision. Often the best stories come from there anyway.
III. QUANTUM BAYESIANISM
Every area of human endeavor has its bold extremes.
Ones that say, “If this is going to be done right, we must
go this far. Nothing less will do.” In probability theory,
the bold extreme is the personalist Bayesian account of
it [13]. It says that probability theory is of the character
of formal logic—a set of criteria for testing consistency.
In the case of formal logic, the consistency is between
truth values of propositions. However logic itself does not
have the power to set the truth values it manipulates. It
can only say if various truth values are consistent or in-
consistent; the actual values come from another source.
Whenever logic reveals a set of truth values to be incon-
sistent, one must dip back into the source to find a way
to alleviate the discord. But precisely in which way to
alleviate it, logic gives no guidance. “Is the truth value
for this one isolated proposition correct?” Logic itself is
powerless to say.
The key idea of personalist Bayesian probability the-
ory is that it too is a calculus of consistency (or “coher-
ence” as the practitioners call it), but this time for one’s
decision-making degrees of belief. Probability theory can
only say if various degrees of belief are consistent or in-
consistent with each other. The actual beliefs come from
another source, and there is nowhere to pin their respon-
sibility but on the agent who holds them. Dennis Lindley
put it nicely in his book Understanding Uncertainty [14]:
The Bayesian, subjectivist, or coherent, para-
digm is egocentric. It is a tale of one person
contemplating the world and not wishing to be
stupid (technically, incoherent). He realizes that
to do this his statements of uncertainty must be
probabilistic.
A probability assignment is a tool an agent uses to make
gambles and decisions—it is a tool he uses for navigat-
ing life and responding to his environment. Probability
theory as a whole, on the other hand, is not about a
single isolated belief, but about a whole mesh of them.
When a belief in the mesh is found to be incoherent with
the others, the theory flags the inconsistency. However,
it gives no guidance for how to mend any incoherences
it finds. To alleviate the discord, one can only dip back
into the source of the assignments—specifically, the agent
who attempted to sum up all his history, experience, and
expectations with those assignments in the first place.
This is the reason for the terminology that a probability
is a “degree of belief” rather than a “degree of truth” or
“degree of facticity.”
Where personalist Bayesianism breaks away the most
from other developments of probability theory is that it
says there are no external criteria for declaring an iso-
lated probability assignment right or wrong. The only
basis for a judgment of adequacy comes from the inside,
from the greater mesh of beliefs the agent may have the
time or energy to access when appraising coherence.
It was not an arbitrary choice of words to title the
previous section QUANTUM STATES DO NOT EXIST,
but a hint of the direction we must take to develop a per-
fected vaccine. This is because the phrase has a precursor
in a slogan Bruno de Finetti, the founder of personalist
Bayesianism, used to vaccinate probability theory itself.
In the preface to his seminal book [15], de Finetti writes,
centered in the page and in all capital letters,
PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST.
It is a powerful statement, constructed to put a finger on
the single most-significant cause of conceptual problems
in pre-Bayesian probability theory. A probability is not
a solid object, like a rock or a tree that the agent might
bump into, but a feeling, an estimate inside himself.
Previous to Bayesianism, probability was often
thought to be a physical property5—something objective
and having nothing to do with decision-making or agents
at all. But when thought so, it could be thought only
inconsistently so. And hell hath no fury like an inconsis-
tency scorned. The trouble is always the same in all its
varied and complicated forms: If probability is to be a
physical property, it had better be a rather ghostly one—
one that can be told of in campfire stories, but never quite
prodded out of the shadows. Here’s a sample dialogue:
Pre-Bayesian: Ridiculous, probabilities are
without doubt objective. They can be seen
in the relative frequencies they cause.
Bayesian: So if p = 0.75 for some event, after
1000 trials we’ll see exactly 750 such events?
Pre-Bayesian: You might, but most likely you
won’t see that exactly. You’re just likely to
see something close to it.
Bayesian: Likely? Close? How do you define or
quantify these things without making refer-
ence to your degrees of belief for what will
happen?
5Witness Richard von Mises, who even went so far as to
write, “Probability calculus is part of theoretical physics in
the same way as classical mechanics or optics, it is an entirely
self-contained theory of certain phenomena . . . ” [16].
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Pre-Bayesian: Well, in any case, in the infinite
limit the correct frequency will definitely
occur.
Bayesian: How would I know? Are you saying
that in one billion trials I could not pos-
sibly see an “incorrect” frequency? In one
trillion?
Pre-Bayesian: OK, you can in principle see
an incorrect frequency, but it’d be ever less
likely!
Bayesian: Tell me once again, what does ‘likely’
mean?
This is a cartoon of course, but it captures the essence
and the futility of every such debate. It is better to admit
at the outset that probability is a degree of belief, and
deal with the world on its own terms as it coughs up its
objects and events. What do we gain for our theoretical
conceptions by saying that along with each actual event
there is a ghostly spirit (its “objective probability,” its
“propensity,” its “objective chance”) gently nudging it
to happen just as it did? Objects and events are enough
by themselves.
Similarly for quantum mechanics. Here too, if ghostly
spirits are imagined behind the actual events produced
in quantum measurements, one is left with conceptual
troubles to no end. The defining feature of Quantum
Bayesianism [1–6] is that it says along the lines of de
Finetti, “If this is going to be done right, we must go
this far.” Specifically, there can be no such thing as a
right and true quantum state, if such is thought of as de-
fined by criteria external to the agent making the assign-
ment: Quantum states must instead be like personalist,
Bayesian probabilities.
The direct connection between the two foundational
issues is this. Quantum states, through the Born Rule,
can be used to calculate probabilities. Conversely, if one
assigns probabilities for the outcomes of a well-selected
set of measurements, then this is mathematically equiva-
lent to making the quantum-state assignment itself. The
two kinds of assignments determine each other uniquely.
Just think of a spin- 12 system. If one has elicited one’s
degrees of belief for the outcomes of a σx measurement,
and similarly one’s degrees of belief for the outcomes of
σy and σz measurements, then this is the same as speci-
fying a quantum state itself: For if one knows the quan-
tum state’s projections onto three independent axes, then
that uniquely determines a Bloch vector, and hence a
quantum state. Something similar is true of all quan-
tum systems of all sizes and dimensionality. There is
no mathematical fact embedded in a quantum state ρ
that is not embedded in an appropriately chosen set of
probabilities.6 Thus generally, if probabilities are per-
6See Section IV where this statement is made precise in all
dimensions.
sonal in the Bayesian sense, then so too must be quantum
states.
What this buys interpretatively, beside airtight consis-
tency with the best understanding of probability theory,
is that it gives each quantum state a home. Indeed, a
home localized in space and time—namely, the physical
site of the agent who assigns it! By this method, one
expels once and for all the fear that quantum mechan-
ics leads to “spooky action at a distance,” and expels as
well any hint of a problem with “Wigner’s friend” [17]. It
does this because it removes the very last trace of confu-
sion over whether quantum states might still be objective,
agent-independent, physical properties.
The innovation here is that, for most of the history
of efforts to take an informational point of view about
quantum states, the supporters of the idea have tried to
have it both ways: that on the one hand quantum states
are not real physical properties, yet on the other there is
a right quantum state independent of the agent after all.
For instance, one hears things like, “The right quantum
state is the one the agent should adopt if he had all the
information.” The tension in these two desires leaves
their holders open to attack on both flanks and general
confusion all around.
Take first instantaneous action at a distance—the hor-
ror of this idea is often one of the strongest motivations
for those seeking to take an informational stance on quan-
tum states. But, now an opponent can say:
If there is a right quantum state, then why
not be done with all this squabbling and call the
state a physical fact to begin with? It is surely
external to the agent if the agent can be wrong
about it. But, once you admit that (and you
should admit it), you’re sunk: For, now what re-
course do you have to declare no action at a dis-
tance when a delocalized quantum state changes
instantaneously?
Here I am with a physical system right in
front of me, and though my probabilities for the
outcomes of measurements I can do on it might
have been adequate a moment ago, there is an
objectively better way to gamble now because
of something that happened far in the distance?
(Far in the distance and just now.) How could
that not be the signature of action at a dis-
tance? You can try to defend yourself by say-
ing “quantum mechanics is all about relations”7
7A typical example is of a woman traveling far from home
when her husband divorces her. Instantaneously she becomes
unmarried—marriage is a relational property, not something
localized at each partner. It seems to be popular to give this
example and say, “Quantum mechanics might be like that.”
The conversation usually stops without elaboration, but let’s
carry it a little further: Suppose the woman is right in front
of me. Would the far-off divorce mean that there is instanta-
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or some other feel-good phrase, but I’m talking
about measurements right here, in front of me,
with outcomes I can see right now. Ones enter-
ing my awareness—not outcomes in the mind of
God who can see everything and all relations. It
is that which I am gambling upon with the help
of the quantum formalism. An objectively better
quantum state would mean that my gambles and
actions, though they would have been adequate
a moment ago, are now simply wrong in the eyes
of the world—they could have been better. How
could the quantum system in front of me generate
outcomes instantiating that declaration without
being privy to what the eyes of the world already
see? That’s action at a distance, I say, or at least
a holism that amounts to the same thing—there’s
nothing else it could be.
Without the protection of truly personal quantum-
state assignments, action at a distance is there as
doggedly as it ever was. And things only get worse with
“Wigner’s friend” if one insists there be a right quantum
state. As it turns out, the method of mending this co-
nundrum displays one of the most crucial ingredients of
QBism. Let us put it in plain sight.
“Wigner’s friend” is the story of two agents, Wigner
and his friend, and one quantum system—the only de-
viation we make from a more common presentation8 is
that we put the story in informational terms. It starts off
with the friend and Wigner having a conversation: Sup-
pose they both agree that some quantum state |ψ〉 cap-
tures their mutual beliefs about the quantum system.9
Furthermore suppose they agree that at a specified time
the friend will make a measurement on the system of
some observable (outcomes i = 1, . . . , d). Finally, they
both note that if the friend gets outcome i, he will (and
should) update his beliefs about the system to some new
quantum state |i〉. There the conversation ends and the
action begins: Wigner walks away and turns his back to
his friend and the supposed measurement. Time passes
to some point beyond when the measurement should have
taken place.
neously a different set of probabilities I could use for weighing
the consequences of trying to seduce her? Not at all. I would
have no account to change my probabilities (not for this rea-
son anyway) until I became aware of her changed relation,
however long it might take that news to get to me.
8For instance, [18] is about as common as they get.
9Being Bayesians, of course, they don’t have to agree at this
stage—for recall |ψ〉 is not a physical fact for them, only a
catalogue of beliefs. But suppose they do agree.
FIG. 1. In contemplating a quantum measurement, one
makes a conceptual split in the world: one part is treated
as an agent, and the other as a kind of reagent or catalyst
(one that brings about change in the agent itself). The latter
is a quantum system of some finite dimension d. A quantum
measurement consists first in the agent taking an action on
the quantum system. The action is represented formally by
a set of operators {Ei}—a positive-operator-valued measure.
The action generally leads to an incompletely predictable con-
sequence Ei for the agent. The quantum state |ψ〉 makes no
appearance but in the agent’s head; for it captures his degrees
of belief concerning the consequences of his actions, and, in
contrast to the quantum system itself, has no existence in the
external world. Measurement devices are depicted as pros-
thetic hands to make it clear that they should be considered
an integral part of the agent. The sparks between the mea-
surement-device hand and the quantum system represent the
idea that the consequence of each quantum measurement is a
unique creation within the previously existing universe. Two
points are decisive in distinguishing this picture of quantum
measurement from a kind of solipsism: 1) The conceptual split
of agent and external quantum system: If it were not needed,
it would not have been made. 2) Once the agent chooses an
action {Ei} to take, the particular consequence Ek of it is be-
yond his control—that is, the actual outcome is not a product
of his whim and fancy.
What now is the “correct” quantum state each agent
should have assigned to the quantum system? We have
already concurred that the friend will and should assign
some |i〉. But what of Wigner? If he were to consistently
dip into his mesh of beliefs, he would very likely treat his
friend as a quantum system like any other: one with some
initial quantum state ρ capturing his (Wigner’s) beliefs
of it (the friend), along with a linear evolution operator10
10We suppose for the sake of introducing less technicality
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U to adjust those beliefs with the flow of time.11 Sup-
pose this quantum state includes Wigner’s beliefs about
everything he assesses to be interacting with his friend—
in old parlance, suppose Wigner treats his friend as an
isolated system.From this perspective, before any further
interaction between himself and the friend or the other
system, the quantum state Wigner would assign for the
two together would be U
(
ρ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|
)
U † — most gener-
ally an entangled quantum state. The state of the system
itself for Wigner would be gotten from this larger state
by a partial trace operation; in any case, it will not be
an |i〉.
Does this make Wigner’s new state assignment incor-
rect? After all, “if he had all the information” (i.e., all
the facts of the world) wouldn’t that include knowing the
friend’s measurement outcome? Since the friend should
assign some |i〉, shouldn’t Wigner himself (if he had all
the information)? Or is it the friend who is incorrect?
For if the friend had “all the information,” wouldn’t he
say that he is neglecting that Wigner could put the sys-
tem and himself into the quantum computational equiv-
alent of an iron lung and forcefully reverse the so-called
measurement? I.e., Wigner, if he were sufficiently sophis-
ticated, should be able to force
U
(
ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|
)
U † −→ ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ| . (1)
And so the back and forth goes. Who has the right state
of information? The conundrums simply get too heavy if
one tries to hold to an agent-independent notion of cor-
rectness for otherwise personalistic quantum states. The
Quantum Bayesian dispels these and similar difficulties of
the “aha, caught you!” variety by being conscientiously
forthright. Whose information? “Mine!” Information
about what? “The consequences (for me) of my actions
upon the physical system!” It’s all “I-I-me-me mine,” as
the Beatles sang.
The answer to the first question surely comes as no sur-
prise by now, but why on earth the answer for the second?
“It’s like watching a Quantum Bayesian shoot himself in
the foot,” a friend once said. Why something so ego-
centric, anthropocentric, psychology-laden, myopic, and
positivistic (we’ve heard any number of expletives) as
the consequences (for me) of my actions upon the sys-
tem? Why not simply say something neutral like “the
outcomes of measurements”? Or, fall in line with Wolf-
gang Pauli and say [21]:
that U is a unitary operation, rather than the more general
completely positive trace-preserving linear maps of quantum
information theory [19]. This, however, is not essential to the
argument.
11For an explanation of the status of unitary operations from
the QBist perspective, as personal judgments directly anal-
ogous to quantum states themselves, see Footnote 22 and
Refs. [2,5,20].
The objectivity of physics is . . . fully ensured in
quantum mechanics in the following sense. Al-
though in principle, according to the theory, it is
in general only the statistics of series of experi-
ments that is determined by laws, the observer
is unable, even in the unpredictable single case,
to influence the result of his observation—as for
example the response of a counter at a particu-
lar instant of time. Further, personal qualities
of the observer do not come into the theory in
any way—the observation can be made by objec-
tive registering apparatus, the results of which
are objectively available for anyone’s inspection.
To the uninitiated, our answer for Information about
what? surely appears to be a cowardly, unnecessary re-
treat from realism. But it is the opposite. The answer we
give is the very injunction that keeps the potentially con-
flicting statements of Wigner and his friend in check,12 at
the same time as giving each agent a hook to the external
world in spite of QBism’s egocentric quantum states.
You see, for the QBist, the real world, the one both
agents are embedded in—with its objects and events—
is taken for granted. What is not taken for granted
is each agent’s access to the parts of it he has not
touched. Wigner holds two thoughts in his head: 1)
that his friend interacted with a quantum system, elicit-
ing some consequence of the interaction for himself, and
2) after the specified time, for any of Wigner’s own fur-
ther interactions with his friend or system or both, he
ought to gamble upon their consequences according to
U
(
ρ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|
)
U †. One statement refers to the friend’s
potential experiences, and one refers to Wigner’s own.
So long as it is kept clear that U
(
ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|
)
U † refers to
the latter—how Wigner should gamble upon the things
that might happen to him—making no statement what-
soever about the former, there is no conflict. The world
is filled with all the same things it was before quantum
theory came along, like each of our experiences, that rock
and that tree, and all the other things under the sun; it
is just that quantum theory provides a calculus for gam-
bling on each agent’s own experiences—it doesn’t give
anything else than that. It certainly doesn’t give one
agent the ability to conceptually pierce the other agent’s
personal experience. It is true that with enough effort
Wigner could enact Eq. (1), causing him to predict that
his friend will have amnesia to any future questions on his
old measurement results. But we always knew Wigner
could do that—a mallet to the head would have been
good enough.
12Pauli’s statement certainly wouldn’t have done that. Re-
sults objectively available for anyone’s inspection? This is
the whole issue with “Wigner’s friend” in the first place. If
both agents could just “look” at the counter simultaneously
with negligible effect in principle, we would not be having this
discussion.
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The key point is that quantum theory, from this light,
takes nothing away from the usual world of common ex-
perience we already know. It only adds.13 At the very
least it gives each agent an extra tool with which to nav-
igate the world. More than that, the tool is here for
a reason. QBism says when an agent reaches out and
touches a quantum system—when he performs a quantum
measurement—that process gives rise to birth in a nearly
literal sense. With the action of the agent upon the sys-
tem, the no-go theorems of Bell and Kochen-Specker as-
sert that something new comes into the world that wasn’t
there previously: It is the “outcome,” the unpredictable
consequence for the very agent who took the action. John
Archibald Wheeler said it this way, and we follow suit,
“Each elementary quantum phenomenon is an elemen-
tary act of ‘fact creation.’ ” [23]
With this much, QBism has a story to tell on both
quantum states and quantum measurements, but what of
quantum theory as a whole? The answer is found in tak-
ing it as a universal single-user theory in much the same
way that Bayesian probability theory is. It is a users’
manual that any agent can pick up and use to help make
wiser decisions in this world of inherent uncertainty.14
To say it in a more poignant way: In my case, it is a
world in which I am forced to be uncertain about the
consequences of most of my actions; and in your case, it
is a world in which you are forced to be uncertain about
the consequences of most of your actions. “And what of
God’s case? What is it for him?” Trying to give him a
quantum state was what caused this trouble in the first
place! In a quantum mechanics with the understanding
that each instance of its use is strictly single-user—“My
measurement outcomes happen right here, to me, and I
am talking about my uncertainty of them.”—there is no
room for most of the standard, year-after-year quantum
13This point will be much elaborated on in the Section VI.
14 Most of the time one sees Bayesian probabilities character-
ized (even by very prominent Bayesians like Edwin T. Jaynes
[22]) as measures of ignorance or imperfect knowledge. But
that description carries with it a metaphysical commitment
that is not at all necessary for the personalist Bayesian, where
probability theory is an extension of logic. Imperfect knowl-
edge? It sounds like something that, at least in imagination,
could be perfected, making all probabilities zero or one—one
uses probabilities only because one does not know the true,
pre-existing state of affairs. Language like this, the reader
will notice, is never used in this paper. All that matters for a
personalist Bayesian is that there is uncertainty for whatever
reason. There might be uncertainty because there is igno-
rance of a true state of affairs, but there might be uncertainty
because the world itself does not yet know what it will give—
i.e., there is an objective indeterminism. As will be argued in
later sections, QBism finds its happiest spot in an unflinch-
ing combination of “subjective probability” with “objective
indeterminism.”
mysteries.
FIG. 2. The Born Rule is not like the other classic laws
of physics. Its normative nature means, if anything, it is
more like the Biblical Ten Commandments. The classic laws
on the left give no choice in their statement: If a field is
going to be an electromagnetic field at all, it must satisfy
Maxwell’s equations; it has no choice. Similarly for the other
classic laws. Their statements are intended to be statements
concerning nature just exactly as it is. But think of the Ten
Commandments. “Thou shalt not steal.” People steal all the
time. The role of the Commandment is to say, “You have the
power to steal if you think you can get away with it, but it’s
probably not in your best interest to do so. Something bad is
likely to happen as a result.” Similarly for “Thou shalt not
kill,” and all the rest. It is the worshipper’s choice to obey
each or not, but if he does not, he ought to count on something
potentially bad in return. The Born Rule guides, “Gamble in
such a way that all your probabilities mesh together through
me.” The agent is free to ignore the advice, but if he does so,
he does so at his own peril.
The only substantive conceptual issue left before syn-
thesizing a final vaccine15 is whether quantum mechanics
is obligated to derive the notion of agent for whose aid
the theory was built in the first place? The answer comes
from turning the tables: Thinking of probability theory
in the personalist Bayesian way, as an extension of for-
mal logic, would one ever imagine that the notion of an
agent, the user of the theory, could be derived out of
its conceptual apparatus? Clearly not. How could you
possibly get flesh and bones out of a calculus for making
wise decisions? The logician and the logic he uses are
two different substances—they live in conceptual cate-
gories worlds apart. One is in the stuff of the physical
world, and one is somewhere nearer to Plato’s heaven of
ideal forms. Look as one might in a probability textbook
for the ingredients to reconstruct the reader himself, one
15Not to worry, there are still plenty of technical ones, as
well as plenty more conceptual ones waiting for after the
vaccination.
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will never find them. So too, the Quantum Bayesian says
of quantum theory.
With this we finally pin down the precise way in which
quantum theory is “different in character from any phys-
ical theory posed before.” For the Quantum Bayesian,
quantum theory is not something outside probability
theory—it is not a picture of the world as it is, as say
Einstein’s program of a unified field theory hoped to be—
but rather it is an addition to probability theory itself.
As probability theory is a normative theory, not saying
what one must believe, but offering rules of consistency
an agent should strive to satisfy within his overall mesh
of beliefs, so it is the case with quantum theory.
To take this substance into one’s mindset is all the
vaccination one needs against the threat that quantum
theory carries something viral for theoretical physics as a
whole. A healthy body is made healthier still. For with
this protection, we are for the first time in a position
to ask, with eyes wide open to what the answer could
not be, just what after all is the world made of? Far
from being the last word on quantum theory, QBism, we
believe, is the start of a great adventure. An adventure
full of mystery and danger, with hopes of triumph . . .
and all the marks of life.
IV. SEEKING SICS – THE BORN RULE AS
FUNDAMENTAL
You know how men have always hankered after unlaw-
ful magic, and you know what a great part in magic
words have always played. If you have his name, . . .
you can control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever
the power may be. Solomon knew the names of all the
spirits, and having their names, he held them subject
to his will. So the universe has always appeared to the
natural mind as a kind of enigma, of which the key
must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or
power-bringing word or name. That word names the
universe’s principle, and to possess it is after a fashion
to possess the universe itself.
But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot
look on any such word as closing your quest. You must
bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it
at work within the stream of your experience. It ap-
pears less as a solution, then, than as a program for
more work, and more particularly as an indication of
the ways in which existing realities may be changed.
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to
enigmas, in which we can rest. We don’t lie back upon
them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature
over again by their aid.
— William James
If quantum theory is a user’s manual, one cannot forget
that the world is its author. And from its writing style,
one may still be able to tell something of the author her-
self. The question is how to tease out the psychology of
the style, frame it, and identify the underlying motif.
Something that cannot be said of the Quantum
Bayesian program is that it has not had to earn its keep
in the larger world of quantum interpretations. Since
the beginning, the promoters of the view have been on
the run proving technical theorems whenever required to
close a gap in its logic or negate an awkwardness induced
by its new way of speaking. It was never enough to “lie
back upon” the pronouncements: They had to be shown
to have substance, something that would drive physics
itself forward. A case in point is the quantum de Finetti
theorem [3,24].
This is a theorem that arose from contemplating the
meaning of one of the most common phrases of quantum
information theory—the unknown quantum state. The
term is ubiquitous: Unknown quantum states are tele-
ported, protected with quantum error correcting codes,
used to check for quantum eavesdropping, and arise
in innumerable other applications. From a Quantum-
Bayesian point of view, however, the phrase can only be
an oxymoron, something that contradicts itself: If quan-
tum states are compendia of beliefs, and not states of
nature, then the state is known to someone, at the very
least the agent who holds it. But if so, then what are the
experimentalists doing when they say they are perform-
ing quantum-state tomography in the laboratory? The
very goal of the procedure is to characterize the unknown
quantum state a piece of laboratory equipment is repeti-
tively preparing. There is certainly no little agent sitting
on the inside of the device devilishly sending out quan-
tum systems representative of his beliefs, and smiling as
an experimenter on the outside slowly homes in on those
private thoughts through his experiments. What gives?
The quantum de Finetti theorem is a technical result
that allows the story of quantum-state tomography to be
told purely in terms of a single agent—namely, the exper-
imentalist in the laboratory. In a nutshell, the theorem
is this. Suppose the experimentalist walks into the labo-
ratory with the very minimal belief that, of the systems
his device is spitting out (no matter how many), he could
interchange any two of them and it would not change the
statistics he expects for any measurements he might per-
form. Then the theorem says “coherence alone” requires
him to make a quantum-state assignment ρ(n) (for any n
of those systems) that can be represented in the form:
ρ(n) =
∫
P (ρ) ρ⊗ndρ , (2)
where P (ρ) dρ is some probability measure on the space
of single-system density operators and ρ⊗n = ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ
represents an n-fold tensor product of identical quantum
states. To put it in words, this theorem licenses the ex-
perimenter to act as if each individual system has some
state ρ unknown to him, with a probability density P (ρ)
representing his ignorance of which state is the true one.
But it is only as if—the only active quantum state in the
picture is the one the experimenter (the agent) actually
possesses, namely ρ(n). The right-hand side of Eq. (2),
though necessary among the possibilities, is just one of
many representations for ρ(n). When the experimenter
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performs tomography, all he is doing is gathering data
system-by-system and updating, via Bayes rule [25], the
state ρ(n) to some new state ρ(k) on a smaller number of
remaining systems. Particularly, one can prove that this
form of quantum-state assignment leads the agent to ex-
pect that with more data, he will approach ever more
closely a posterior state of the form ρ(k) = ρ⊗k. This is
why one gets into the habit of speaking of tomography
as revealing “the unknown quantum state.”
This example is just one of several [3,26,27,20], and
what they all show is that the point of view has some
technical crunch16—it is not just stale, lifeless philoso-
phy. It stands a chance to “make nature over again by
its aid.” What better way to master a writer’s intentions
than to edit her draft and see if she tolerates the changes,
admitting in the end that the story flows more easily?
In this regard, no question of QBism tests nature’s tol-
erance more probingly than this. If quantum theory is
so closely allied with probability theory, if it can even be
seen as an addition to it, then why is it not written in a
language that starts with probability, rather than a lan-
guage that ends with it? Why does quantum theory in-
voke the mathematical apparatus of complex amplitudes,
Hilbert spaces, and linear operators? This brings us to
present-day research at Perimeter Institute.
For, actually there are ways to pose quantum theory
purely in terms of probabilities—indeed, there are many
ways, each with a somewhat different look and feel [29].
The work of W. K. Wootters is an example, and as he
emphasized long ago [30],
It is obviously possible to devise a formula-
tion of quantum mechanics without probability
amplitudes. One is never forced to use any quan-
tities in one’s theory other than the raw results
of measurements. However, there is no reason to
expect such a formulation to be anything other
than extremely ugly. After all, probability am-
plitudes were invented for a reason. They are not
as directly observable as probabilities, but they
make the theory simple. I hope to demonstrate
here that one can construct a reasonably pretty
formulation using only probabilities. It may not
be quite as simple as the usual formulation, but
it is not much more complicated.
What has happened in the intervening years is that the
mathematical structures of quantum information theory
have grown significantly richer than the ones he had
based his considerations on—so much so that we may
now be able to optimally re-express the theory. What
16In fact, the quantum de Finetti theorem has long left its
foundational roots behind and found far more widespread
recognition with its applications to quantum cryptography
[28].
was once “not much more complicated,” now has the
promise of being downright insightful.
The key ingredient is a hypothetical structure called a
“symmetric informationally complete positive-operator-
valued measure,” or SIC (pronounced “seek”) for short.
This is a set of d2 rank-one projection operators Πi =
|ψi〉〈ψi| on a finite d-dimensional Hilbert space such that
∣∣〈ψi|ψj〉∣∣2 = 1
d+ 1
whenever i 6= j . (3)
Because of their extreme symmetry, it turns out that
such sets of operators, when they exist, have three very
fine-tuned properties: 1) the operators must be linearly
independent and span the space of Hermitian operators,
2) there is a sense in which they come as close to an or-
thonormal basis for operator space as they can (under
the constraint that all the elements in a basis be pos-
itive semi-definite), and 3) after rescaling, they form a
resolution of the identity operator, I =
∑
i
1
d
Πi.
The symmetry, positive semi-definiteness, and prop-
erties 1 and 2 are significant because they imply that
an arbitrary quantum state ρ—pure or mixed—can be
expressed as a linear combination of the Πi. Further-
more, the expansion is likely to have some significant
features not found in other, more arbitrary expansions.
The most significant of these becomes apparent when one
takes property 3 into account. Because the operators
Hi =
1
d
Πi are positive semi-definite and form a resolu-
tion of the identity, they can be interpreted as labeling
the outcomes of a quantum measurement device—not a
standard-textbook, von Neumann measurement device
whose outcomes correspond to the eigenvalues of some
Hermitian operator, but to a measurement device of the
most general variety allowed by quantum theory, the
so-called “positive-operator-valued measures” (POVMs)
[19,31]. Particularly noteworthy is the smooth relation
between the probabilities P (Hi) = tr
(
ρHi
)
given by the
Born Rule for the outcomes of such a measurement17 and
the expansion coefficients for ρ in terms of the Πi:
ρ =
d2∑
i=1
(
(d+ 1)P (Hi)−
1
d
)
Πi . (4)
There are no other operator bases that give rise to such
a simple formula connecting probabilities with density
operators, and it suggests that this is just the place the
Quantum Bayesian should seek his motif.
17There is a slight ambiguity in notation here, asHi is dually
used to denote an operator and an outcome of a measurement.
For the sake of simplicity, we hope the reader will forgive this
and similar abuses.
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|ψ〉 = α
3
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σ−3f−
σ8f+
σ5f−


+
β−eiθ+
3
√
2


σ8f−
σ−7f+
f−
σ−7f+
σ8f−
σ9f−


+
β+e
iθ−
3
√
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
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√
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√
6
√
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√
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√
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√
21±
√
14
√
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28
eiθ± =
1
2
(√
46− 6
√
21∓ 6g ± i
√
18 + 6
√
21± 6g
)1
3
FIG. 3. D. M. Appleby’s “pencil-and-paper” SIC in
dimension 6. This is an example of one vector |ψ〉 among
the 36 that go together to form the simplest known SIC in
d = 6. One of the many problems facing a proof of general
SIC existence is that no one has yet latched onto a universal
pattern in the existing analytic solutions—every dimension
appears to be of a distinct character.
Before getting to that, however, we should reveal what
is so consternating about the SICs: It is the question
of whether they exist at all. Despite 10 years of grow-
ing effort since the definition was first introduced [32–34]
(there are now nearly 50 papers on the subject), no one
has been able to show that they exist in completely gen-
eral dimension. All that is known firmly is that they exist
in dimensions 2 through 67 [35]. Dimensions 2 – 15, 19,
24, 35, and 48 are known through direct or computer-
automated analytic proof; the remaining solutions are
known through numerical simulation, satisfying Eq. (3)
to within a precision of 10−38. How much evidence is
this that SICs exist generally? The reader must answer
this one for himself (certainly there can be no reader-
independent answer to something so subjective!), but for
the remainder of the article we will proceed as if they
do always exist for finite d. At least this is the conceit
of our story. We note in passing, however, that the SIC
existence problem is not without wider context: if they
do exist, they solve at least three other (more practical,
non-foundational) optimality problems in quantum infor-
mation theory [36–39]—it would be a nasty trick if SICs
didn’t always exist!
FIG. 4. Any quantum measurement can be conceptualized
in two ways. Suppose an arbitrary von Neumann measure-
ment “on the ground,” with outcomes Dj = 1, . . . , d. Its
probabilities P (Dj) can be derived by cascading it with a
fixed fiducial SIC measurement “in the sky” (of outcomes
Hi = 1, . . . , d
2). Let P (Hi) and P (Dj |Hi) represent an
agent’s probabilities, assuming the measurement in the sky
is actually performed. The probability Q(Dj) represents in-
stead the agent’s probabilities under the assumption that the
measurement in the sky is not performed. The Born Rule,
in this language, says that P (Dj), P (Hi), and P (Dj |Hi) are
related by the Bayesian-style Eq. (8).
So suppose they do. Thinking of a quantum state as lit-
erally an agent’s probability assignment for the outcomes
of a potential SIC measurement leads to a new way to ex-
press the Born Rule for the probabilities associated with
any other quantum measurement. Consider the diagram
in Figure 4. It depicts a SIC measurement “in the sky,”
with outcomes Hi, and any standard von Neumann mea-
surement “on the ground.”18 For the sake of specificity,
let us say the latter has outcomesDj = |j〉〈j|, the vectors
|j〉 representing some orthonormal basis. We conceive of
two possibilities (or two “paths”) for a given quantum
system to get to the measurement on the ground: “Path
1” is that it proceeds directly to the measurement on
the ground. “Path 2” is that it proceeds first to the
measurement in the sky and only subsequently to the
18Do not, however, let the designation “SIC sitting in the
sky” make the device seem too exalted and unapproachable.
Actual implementations have already been built for both
qubits [40] and qutrits [42].
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measurement on the ground—the two measurements are
cascaded.
Suppose now, we are given the agent’s personal prob-
abilities P (Hi) for the outcomes in the sky and his con-
ditional probabilities P (Dj |Hi) for the outcomes on the
ground subsequent to the sky. I.e., we are given the prob-
abilities the agent would assign on the supposition that
the quantum system follows Path 2. Then “coherence
alone” (in the Bayesian sense) is enough to tell what
probabilities P (Dj) the agent should assign for the out-
comes of the measurement on the ground—it is given by
the Law of Total Probability applied to these numbers:
P (Dj) =
∑
i
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi) . (5)
That takes care of Path 2, but what of Path 1? Is this
enough information to recover the probability assignment
Q(Dj) the agent would assign for the outcomes on Path
1 via a normal application of the Born Rule? That is,
that
Q(Dj) = tr(ρDj) (6)
for some quantum state ρ? Maybe, but the answer will
clearly not be P (Dj). One has
Q(Dj) 6= P (Dj) (7)
simply because Path 2 is not a coherent process (in the
quantum sense!) with respect to Path 1—there is a mea-
surement that takes place in Path 2 that does not take
place in Path 1.
What is remarkable about the SIC representation is
that it implies that, even though Q(Dj) is not equal to
P (Dj), it is still a function of it. Particularly,
Q(Dj) = (d+ 1)P (Dj)− 1
= (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− 1 . (8)
The Born Rule is nothing but a kind of Quantum
Law of Total Probability! No complex amplitudes, no
operators—only probabilities in, and probabilities out.
Indeed, it is seemingly just a rescaling of the old law,
Eq. (5). And in a way it is.
But beware: One should not interpret Eq. (8) as inval-
idating probability theory itself in any way: For the old
Law of Total Probability has no jurisdiction in the setting
of our diagram, which compares a “factual” experiment
(Path 1) to a “counterfactual” one (Path 2).19 Indeed as
19Indeed, as we have emphasized, there is a trace of a very
old antibody in QBism. While writing this essay, it came to
light in the nice historical study of Ref. [41] that Born and
any Bayesian would emphasize, if there is a distinguish-
ing mark in one’s considerations—say, the fact of two
distinct experiments, not one—then one ought to take
that into account in one’s probability assignments (at
least initially so). Thus there is a hidden, or at least sup-
pressed, condition in our notation: Really we should have
been writing the more cumbersome, but honest, expres-
sions P (Hi|E2), P (Dj|Hi, E2), P (Dj|E2), and Q(Dj |E1)
all along. With this explicit, it is no surprise that,
Q(Dj |E1) 6=
∑
i
P (Hi|E2)P (Dj |Hi, E2) . (9)
The message is that quantum theory supplies some-
thing—a new form of “Bayesian coherence,” though em-
pirically based (as quantum theory itself is)—that raw
probability theory does not. The Born Rule in these
lights is an addition to Bayesian probability, not in the
sense of a supplier of some kind of more-objective prob-
abilities, but in the sense of giving extra normative rules
to guide the agent’s behavior when he interacts with the
physical world.
It is a normative rule for reasoning about the conse-
quences of one’s proposed actions in terms of the poten-
tial consequences of an explicitly counterfactual action.
It is like nothing else physical theory has contemplated
before. Seemingly at the heart of quantum mechanics
from the QBist view is a statement about the impact of
counterfactuality. The impact parameter is metered by a
single, significant number associated with each physical
system—its Hilbert-space dimension d. The larger the d
associated with a system, the more Q(Dj) must deviate
from P (Dj). Of course this point must have been implicit
in the usual form of the Born Rule, Eq. (6). What is im-
portant from the QBist perspective, however, is how the
new form puts the significant parameter front and center,
displaying it in a way that one ought to nearly trip over.
Understanding this as the goal helps pinpoint the role
of SICs in our considerations. The issue is not that quan-
tum mechanics must be rewritten in terms of SICs, but
that it can be.20 Certainly no one is going to drop the
usual operator formalism and all the standard methods
learned in graduate school to do their workaday calcu-
lations in SIC language exclusively. It is only that the
SICs form an ideal coordinate system for a particular
problem (an important one to be sure, but nonetheless
Heisenberg, already at the 1927 Solvay conference, refer to the
calculation |cn(t)|
2 =
∣∣∑
m
Smn(t)cm(0)
∣∣2 and say, “it should
be noted that this ‘interference’ does not represent a contra-
diction with the rules of the probability calculus, that is, with
the assumption that the |Snk|
2 are quite usual probabilities.”
Their reasons for saying this may have been different from
our own, but at least they had come this far.
20If everything goes right, that is, and the damned things
actually exist in all dimensions!
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a particular one)—the problem of interpreting quantum
mechanics. The point of all the various representations
of quantum mechanics (like the various quasi-probability
representations of [29], the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger
pictures, and even the path-integral formulation) is that
they give a means for isolating one or another aspect of
the theory that might be called for by a problem at hand.
Sometimes it is really important to do so, even for deep
conceptual issues and even if all the representations are
logically equivalent.21 In our case, we want to bring into
plain view the idea that quantum mechanics is an ad-
dition to Bayesian probability theory—not a generaliza-
tion of it [43], not something orthogonal to it altogether
[44], but an addition. With this goal in mind, the SIC
representation is a particularly powerful tool. Through
it, one sees the Born Rule as a functional of a usage of
the Law of Total Probability that one would have made
in another (counterfactual) context.22 The SICs empha-
21Just think of the story of Eddington-Finkelstein coordi-
nates in general relativity. Once upon a time it was not
known whether a Schwarzschild black hole might have, be-
side its central singularity, a singularity in the gravitational
field at the event horizon. Apparently it was a heated debate,
yes or no. The issue was put to rest, however, with the de-
velopment of the coordinate system. It allowed one to write
down a solution to the Einstein equations in a neighborhood
of the horizon and check that everything was alright after all.
22 Furthermore it is similarly so of unitary time evolution in
a SIC picture. To explain what this means, let us change con-
siderations slightly and make the measurement on the ground
a unitarily rotated version of the SIC in the sky. This con-
trasts with the von Neumann measurement we have previ-
ously restricted the ground measurement to be. In this set-
ting, Dj =
1
d
UΠjU
†, which in turn implies a slight modifica-
tion to Eq. (8),
Q(Dj) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)−
1
d
, (10)
for the probabilities on the ground. Note what this is saying!
As the Born Rule is a functional of the Law of Total Prob-
ability, unitary time evolution is a functional of it as well.
For, if we thought in terms of the Scho¨dinger picture, P (Hi)
and Q(Dj) would be the SIC representations for the initial
and final quantum states under an evolution given by U†.
The similarity is no accident. This is because in both cases
the conditional probabilities P (Dj |Hi) completely encode the
identity of a measurement on the ground.
Moreover, it makes abundantly clear another point of QBism
that has not been addressed so much in the present paper.
Since a personalist Bayesian cannot turn his back on the clar-
ification that all probabilities are personal judgments, place-
holders in a calculus of consistency, he certainly cannot turn
his back on the greater lesson Eqs. (8) and (10) are trying
to scream out. Just as quantum states ρ are personal judg-
ments P (Hi), quantum measurement operators Dj and uni-
size and make this point clear. At the end of the day
however, after all the foundational worries of quantum
theory are finally overcome, the SICs might in principle
be thrown away, just as the scaffolding surrounding any
finished construction would be.
Much of the most intense research of Perimeter Insti-
tute’s QBism group is currently devoted to seeing how
much of the essence of quantum theory is captured by
Eq. (8). For instance, one way to approach this is to
take Eq. (8) as a fundamental axiom and ask what further
assumptions are required to recover all of quantum the-
ory? To give some hint of how a reconstruction of quan-
tum theory might proceed along these lines, note Eq. (4)
again. What it expresses is that any quantum state ρ
can be reconstructed from the probabilities P (Hi) the
state ρ gives rise to. This, however, does not imply that
plugging just any probability distribution P (Hi) into the
equation will give rise to a valid quantum state. A gen-
eral probability distribution P (Hi) in the formula will
lead to a Hermitian operator of trace one, but it may not
lead to an operator with nonnegative eigenvalues. In-
deed it takes further restrictions on the P (Hi) to make
this true. That being the case, the Quantum Bayesian
starts to wonder if these restrictions might arise from the
requirement that Eq. (8) simply always make sense. For
note, if P (Dj) is too small, Q(Dj) will go negative; and
if P (Dj) is too large, Q(Dj) will become larger than 1.
So, P (Dj) must be restricted. But that in turn forces the
set of valid P (Hi) to be restricted as well. And so the
argument goes. For sure, some amount of quantum the-
ory (and maybe all of it) is reconstructed in this fashion
[5,45–47].
Another exciting development comes from loosening
the form of Eq. (8) to something more generic:
Q(Dj) = α
n∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− β , (11)
where there is initially no assumed relation between α,
β, and n as there is in Eq. (8). Then, under a few further
conditions with only the faintest hint of quantum theory
tary time evolutions U are personal judgments too—in this
case P (Dj |Hi). The only distinction is the technical one,
that one expression is an unconditioned probability, while the
other is a collection of conditionals. Most importantly, it set-
tles the age-old issue of why there should be two kinds of state
evolution at all. When Hartle wrote, “A quantum-mechanical
state being a summary of the observers’ information about an
individual physical system changes both by dynamical laws,
and whenever the observer acquires new information about
the system through the process of measurement,” what is his
dynamical law making reference to? There are not two things
that a quantum state can do, only one: Strive to be consis-
tent with all the agent’s other probabilistic judgments on the
consequences of his actions, factual and counterfactual.
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in them—for instance, that there should exist measure-
ments on the ground for which, under appropriate con-
ditions, one can have certainty for their outcomes—one
immediately gets a significantly more restricted form for
this relation:
Q(Dj) =
(
1
2
qd+ 1
) n∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)−
1
2
q , (12)
where very interestingly the parameters q and d can
only take on integer values, q = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ and d =
2, 3, 4, . . . ,∞, and n = 12qd(d− 1) + d.
The q = 2 case can be identified with the quantum
mechanical one we have seen before. On the other hand,
the q = 0 case can be identified with the usual vision of
the classical world: A world where counterfactuals sim-
ply do not matter, for the world just “is.” In this case, an
agent is well advised to take Q(Dj) = P (Dj), meaning
that there is no operational distinction between exper-
iments E1 and E2 for him. It should not be forgotten
however, that this rule, trivial though it looks, is still an
addition to raw probability theory. It is just one that
meshes well with what had come to be expected by most
classical physicists. To put it yet another way, in the
q = 0 case, the agent says to himself that the fine de-
tails of his actions do not matter. This to some extent
authorizes the view that observation is a passive pro-
cess in principle—again the classical worldview. Finally,
the cases q = 1 and q = 4, though not classical, track
still other structures that have been explored previously:
They correspond to what the Born Rule would look like
if alternate versions of quantum mechanics, those over
real [48] and quaternionic [49] vector spaces, were ex-
pressed in the equivalent of SIC terms.23
Formula (12) from the general setting indicates more
strongly than ever that it is the role of dimension that
is key to distilling the motif of our user’s manual. Quan-
tum theory, seen as a normative addition to probability
theory, is just one theory (the second rung above classi-
cal) along an infinite hierarchy. What distinguishes the
levels of this hierarchy is the strength q with which di-
mension “couples” the two paths in our diagram of Fig-
ure 2. It is the strength with which we are compelled
to deviate from the Law of Total Probability when we
transform our thoughts from the consequences of coun-
terfactual actions upon a d’s worth of the world’s stuff
to the consequences of our factual ones. Settling upon
23The equivalent of SICs (i.e., informationally complete sets
of equiangular projection operators) certainly do not exist
in general dimensions for the real-vector-space case—instead
these structures only exist in a sparse set of dimensions,
d = 2, 3, 7, 23, . . . . With respect to the quaternionic theory, it
appears from numerical work that they do not generally exist
in that setting either [50]. Complex quantum mechanics, like
baby bear’s possessions, appears to be just right.
q = 2 (i.e., settling upon quantum theory itself) sets
the strength of the coupling, but the d variable remains.
Different systems, different d, different deviations from a
naive application of the Law of Total Probability.
In some way yet to be fully fleshed out, each quan-
tum system seems to be a seat of active counterfactuality
and possibility, whose outward effect is as an “agent of
change” for the parts of the world that come into con-
tact with it. Observer and system, “agent and reagent,”
might be a way to put it. Perhaps no metaphor is more
pregnant for QBism’s next move than this: If a quan-
tum system is comparable to a chemical reagent, then d
is comparable to a valence. But valence for what more
exactly?
V. THE ESSENCE OF BELL’S THEOREM,
QBISM STYLE
It is easy enough to say that a quantum system (and
hence each piece of the world) is a “seat of possibility.” In
a spotty way, certain philosophers have been saying sim-
ilar things for 150 years. What is unique about quantum
theory in the history of thought is the way in which its
mathematical structure has pushed this upon us to our
very surprise. It wasn’t that all these grand statements
on the philosophical structure of the world were built
into the formalism, but that the formalism reached out
and shook its users until they opened their eyes. Bell’s
theorem and all its descendants are examples of that.
So when the users opened their eyes, what did they
see? From the look of several recent prominent exposi-
tions on the subject [51–53], it was “nonlocality everlast-
ing!” That the world really is full of spooky action at a
distance—live with it and love it. But conclusions drawn
from even the most rigorous of theorems can only be ad-
ditions to one’s prior understanding and beliefs when the
theorems do not contradict those beliefs flat out. Such
was the case with Bell’s theorem. It has just enough
room in it to not contradict a misshapen notion of prob-
ability, and that is the hook and crook that the lovers of
Star Trek have thrived on. The Quantum Bayesian, how-
ever, with a different understanding of probability and
a commitment to the idea that quantum measurement
outcomes are personal, draws quite a different conclu-
sion from the theorem. In fact it is a conclusion from the
far opposite end of the spectrum: It tells of a world un-
known to most monist and rationalist philosophies: The
universe, far from being one big nonlocal block, should be
thought of as a thriving community of marriageable, but
otherwise autonomous entities. That the world should
violate Bell’s theorem remains, even for QBism, the deep-
est statement ever drawn from quantum theory. It says
that quantum measurements are moments of creation.
This language has already been integral to our presen-
tation, but seeing it come about in a formalism-driven
way like Bell’s makes the issue particularly vivid. Here
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we devote some effort to showing that the language of
creation is a consequence of three things: 1) the quan-
tum formalism, 2) a personalist Bayesian interpretation
of probability, and 3) the elementary notion of what it
means to be two objects rather than one. We do not do
it however with Bell’s theorem precisely, but with an ar-
gument that more directly implicates the EPR “criterion
of reality” as the source of trouble with quantum theory.
The thrust of it is that it is the EPR criterion that should
be jettisoned, not locality.
Our starting point is like our previous setup—an agent
and a system—but this time we make it two systems:
One of them, the left-hand one, is ready. The other,
the right-hand one, is waiting. The agent will eventually
measure each in turn.24 Simple enough to say, but things
get hung at the start with the issue of what is meant by
“two systems?” A passage from a 1948 paper of Einstein
[54] captures the essential issue well:
If one asks what is characteristic of the realm
of physical ideas independently of the quantum-
theory, then above all the following attracts our
attention: the concepts of physics refer to a real
external world, i.e., ideas are posited of things
that claim a “real existence” independent of the
perceiving subject (bodies, fields, etc.), and these
ideas are, on the one hand, brought into as secure
a relationship as possible with sense impressions.
Moreover, it is characteristic of these physical
things that they are conceived of as being ar-
ranged in a space-time continuum. Further, it
appears to be essential for this arrangement of
the things introduced in physics that, at a specific
time, these things claim an existence independent
of one another, insofar as these things “lie in dif-
ferent parts of space.” Without such an assump-
tion of the mutually independent existence (the
“being-thus”) of spatially distant things, an as-
sumption which originates in everyday thought,
physical thought in the sense familiar to us would
not be possible. Nor does one see how physical
laws could be formulated and tested without such
a clean separation. . . .
For the relative independence of spatially dis-
tant things (A and B), this idea is characteristic:
an external influence on A has no immediate ef-
fect on B; this is known as the “principle of local
action,” . . . . The complete suspension of this ba-
sic principle would make impossible the idea of
(quasi-) closed systems and, thereby, the estab-
lishment of empirically testable laws in the sense
familiar to us.
We hope it is clear to the reader by now that QBism
24It should be noted how we depart from the usual presenta-
tion here: There is only the single agent and his two systems.
There is no Alice and Bob accompanying the two systems.
concurs with every bit of this. Quantum states may not
be the stuff of the world, but QBists never shudder from
positing quantum systems as “real existences” external
to the agent. And just as the agent has learned from
long, hard experience that he cannot reach out and touch
anything but his immediate surroundings, so he imagines
of every quantum system, one to the other. What is it
that A and B are spatially distant things but that they
are causally independent?
This notion, in Einstein’s hands,25 led to one of the
nicest, most direct arguments that quantum states can-
not be states of reality, but must be something more like
states of information, knowledge, expectation, or belief
[56]. The argument is important—let us repeat the whole
thing from Einstein’s most thorough version of it [57]. It
more than anything sets the stage for a QBist develop-
ment of a Bell-style contradiction.
Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp
reality as it is thought independently of its being
observed. In this sense on speaks of “physical
reality.” In pre-quantum physics there was no
doubt as to how this was to be understood. In
Newton’s theory reality was determined by a ma-
terial point in space and time; in Maxwell’s the-
ory, by the field in space and time. In quantum
mechanics it is not so easily seen. If one asks:
does a ψ-function of the quantum theory repre-
sent a real factual situation in the same sense
in which this is the case of a material system of
points or of an electromagnetic field, one hesi-
tates to reply with a simple “yes” or “no”; why?
What the ψ-function (at a definite) time asserts,
is this: What is the probability for finding a def-
inite physical magnitude q (or p) in a definitely
given interval, if I measure it at time t? The prob-
ability is here to be viewed as an empirically de-
terminable, therefore certainly as a “real” quan-
tity which I may determine if I create the same ψ-
function very often and perform a q-measurement
each time. But what about the single measured
value of q? Did the respective individual system
have this q-value even before this measurement?
To this question there is no definite answer within
the framework of the theory, since the measure-
ment is a process which implies a finite distur-
bance of the system from the outside; it would
therefore be thinkable that the system obtains a
definite numerical value for q (or p) the measured
numerical value, only through the measurement
itself. For the further discussion I shall assume
two physicists A and B, who represent a different
25Beware! This is not to say in the hands of EPR—Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen. The present argument is not their ar-
gument. For a discussion of Einstein’s dissatisfaction with the
one appearing in the EPR paper itself, see [55].
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conception with reference to the real situation as
described by the ψ-function.
A. The individual system (before the measure-
ment) has a definite value of q (or p) for all
variables of the system, and more specifi-
cally, that value which is determined by a
measurement of this variable. Proceeding
from this conception, he will state: The ψ-
function is no exhaustive description of the
real situation of the system but an incom-
plete description; it expresses only what we
know on the basis of former measurements
concerning the system.
B. The individual system (before the measure-
ment) has no definite value of q (or p).
The value of the measurement only arises
in cooperation with the unique probability
which is given to it in view of the ψ-function
only through the act of measurement it-
self. Proceeding from this conception, he
will (or, at least, he may) state: The ψ-
function is an exhaustive description of the
real situation of the system.
We now present to these two physicists the fol-
lowing instance: There is to be a system which
at the time t of our observation consists of two
partial systems S1 and S2, which at this time
are spatially separated and (in the sense of clas-
sical physics) are without significant reciprocity.
The total system is to be completely described
through a known ψ-function ψ12 in the sense of
quantum mechanics. All quantum theoreticians
now agree upon the following: If I make a com-
plete measurement of S1, I get from the results of
the measurement and from ψ12 an entirely defi-
nite ψ-function ψ2 of the system S2. The charac-
ter of ψ2 then depends upon what kind of mea-
surement I undertake on S1.
Now it appears to me that one may speak of
the real factual situation of the partial system
S2. Of this real factual situation, we know to
begin with, before the measurement of S1, even
less than we know of a system described by the
ψ-function. But on one supposition we should,
in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: The real fac-
tual situation of the system S2 is independent of
what is done with the system S1, which is spa-
tially separated from the former. According to
the type of measurement which I make of S1, I
get, however, a very different ψ2 for the second
partial system. Now, however, the real situation
of S2 must be independent of what happens to
S1. For the same real situation of S2 it is pos-
sible therefore to find, according to one’s choice,
different types of ψ-function. . . .
If now the physicists, A and B, accept this
consideration as valid, then B will have to give
up his position that the ψ-function constitutes a
complete description of a real factual situation.
For in this case it would be impossible that two
different types of ψ-functions could be coordi-
nated with the identical factual situation of S2.
Aside from asserting a frequentistic conception of prob-
ability, the argument is nearly perfect.26 It tells us one
important reason why we should not be thinking of quan-
tum states as the ψ-ontologists do. Particularly, it is one
we should continue to bear in mind as we move to a Bell-
type setting: Even there, there is no reason to waiver
on its validity. It may be true that Einstein implicitly
equated “incomplete description” with “there must exist
a hidden-variable account” (though we do not think he
did), but the argument as stated neither stands nor falls
on this issue.
There is, however, one thing that Einstein does miss
in his argument, and this is where the structure of Bell’s
thinking steps in. Einstein says, “to this question there is
no definite answer within the framework of the theory”
when speaking of whether quantum measurements are
“generative” or simply “revealing” of their outcomes. If
we accept everything he has already said, then with a
little clever combinatorics and geometry one can indeed
settle the question.
Let us suppose that the two spatially separated sys-
tems in front of the agent are two ququarts (i.e., each sys-
tem is associated with a four-dimensional Hilbert space
H4), and that the agent ascribes a maximally entangled
state to the pair, i.e., a state |ψ〉 in H4⊗H4 of the form,
|ψ〉 =
1
2
4∑
i=1
|i〉|i〉 . (13)
Then we know that there exist pairs of measurements,
one for each of the separate systems, such that if the out-
come of one is known (whatever the outcome), one will
thereafter make a probability-one statement concerning
the outcome of the other. For instance, if a nondegener-
ate Hermitian operator H is measured on the left-hand
system, then one will thereafter ascribe a probability-one
assignment for the appropriate outcome of the transposed
operatorHT on the right-hand system. What this means
for a Bayesian agent is that after performing the first
measurement he will bet his life on the outcome of the
second.
But how could that be if he has already recognized two
systems with no instantaneous causal influence between
each other? Mustn’t it be that the outcome on the right-
hand side is “already there” simply awaiting confirmation
or registration? It would seem Einstein’s physicist B is
already living in a state of contradiction.
26You see, there really was a reason for including Einstein
with Heisenberg, Pauli, Peierls, Wheeler, and Peres at the
beginning of the article. Still, please reread Footnote 14.
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Indeed it must be this kind of thinking that led Ein-
stein’s collaborators Podolsky and Rosen to their famous
sufficient criterion for an “element of [preexistent] real-
ity” [55]:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we
can predict with certainty (i.e., with probabil-
ity equal to unity) the value of a physical quan-
tity, then there exists an element of reality cor-
responding to that quantity.
Without doubt, no personalist Bayesian would ever ut-
ter such a notion: Just because he believes something
with all his heart and soul and would gamble his life on
it, it would not make it necessarily so by the powers of
nature—even a probability-one assignment is a state of
belief for the personalist Bayesian. But he might still
entertain something not unrelated to the EPR criterion
of reality. Namely, that believing a particular outcome
will be found with certainty on a causally disconnected
system entails that one also believes the outcome to be
“already there” simply awaiting confirmation.
But it is not so, and the Quantum Bayesian has al-
ready built this into his story of measurement. Let us
show this presently27 by combining all the above with
a beautifully simple Kochen-Specker style construction
discovered by Cabello, Estebaranz, and Garc´ıa-Alcaine
(CEGA) [61]. Imagine some measurement H on the left-
hand system; we will denote its potential outcomes as a
column of letters, like this
a
b
c
d
(14)
Further, since there is a fixed transformation taking any
H on the left-hand system to a corresponding HT on the
right-hand one, there is no harm in identifying the no-
tation for the outcomes of both measurements. That is
to say, if the agent gets outcome b (to the exclusion of
a, c, and d) for H on the left-hand side, he will make a
probability-one prediction for b on the right-hand side,
even though that measurement strictly speaking is a dif-
ferent one, namely HT. If the agent further subscribes to
(our Bayesian variant of) the EPR criterion of reality, he
will say that he believes b to be TRUE of the right-hand
system as an element of reality.
Now let us consider two possible measurements, H1
and H2 for the left-hand side, with potential outcomes
a
b
c
d
and
e
f
g
h
(15)
27Overall this particular technique has its roots in Stairs [58],
and seems to bear some resemblance to the gist of Conway
and Kochen’s “Free Will Theorem” [59,60].
respectively. Both measurements cannot be performed
at once, but it might be the case that if the agent gets
a specific outcome for H1, say c particularly, then not
only will he make a probability-one assignment for c in
a measurement of HT1 on the right-hand side, but also
for e in a measurement of HT2 on it. Similarly, if H2
were measured on the left, getting an outcome e; then he
will make a probability-one prediction for c in a measure-
ment of HT1 on the right. This would come about if H1
and H2 (and consequently H
T
1 and H
T
2 ) share a common
eigenvector. Supposing so and that c was actually the
outcome for H1 on the left, what conclusion would the
EPR criterion of reality draw? It is that both c and e are
elements of reality on the right, and none of a, b, d, f ,
g, or h are. Particularly, since the right-hand side could
not have known whether H1 or H2 was measured on the
left, whatever c and e stands for, it must be the same
thing, the same property. In such a case, we discard the
extraneous distinction between c and e in our notation
and write
a
b
c
d
and
c
f
g
h
(16)
for the two potential outcome sets for a measurement on
the right.
We now have all the notational apparatus we need to
have some fun. The genius of CEGA was that they were
able to find a set of nine “interlocking” Hermitian oper-
ators H1, H2, . . . , H9 for the left, whose set of potential
outcomes for the corresponding operators on the right
would look like this:
a
b
c
d
a
e
f
g
h
i
c
j
h
k
g
l
b
e
m
n
i
k
n
o
p
q
d
j
p
r
f
l
q
r
m
o
(17)
Take the second column as an example. It means that if
H2 were measured on the left-hand system, only one of a,
e, f , or g would occur—the agent cannot predict which—
but if a occurred, he would be absolutely certain of it also
occurring in a measurement of HT1 on the right. And if
e were to occur on the left, then he would be certain of
getting e as well in a measurement of HT5 on the right.
And similarly with f and g, with their implications for
HT8 and H
T
4 .
The wonderful thing to note about (17) is that every
letter a, b, c, . . . , r occurs exactly twice in the collection.
But the EPR criterion of reality (or our Bayesian variant
of it) would require exactly one letter to have the truth
value TRUE in each column, with the other three having
the value FALSE. In total, nine values of TRUE: A clean
contradiction! For if every letter occurs exactly twice
in the collection, whatever the total number of TRUE
values is, it must be an even number.
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Something must give. The quick reaction of most of
the quantum foundations community has been to ques-
tion the causal independence of the two systems under
consideration. But if one gives up on the autonomy of
one system from the other—after very explicitly assum-
ing it—this surely amounts to saying that there were
never two systems there after all; the very idea of sep-
arate systems is a broken concept. This first raises a
minor conundrum: Why then would the quantum for-
malism engender us to formulate our description from
beginning to end in terms of H4 ⊗H4, rather than sim-
ply a raw sixteen-dimensional space H16? Why is that
separating symbol ⊗, apparently marking some kind of
conceptual distinction, always dangling around?
Reaching much deeper however, if one is willing to
throw away one’s belief in systems’ autonomy from each
other, why would one ever believe in one’s own auton-
omy? All stringent reason for it gets lost, and indeed as
Einstein warns, what now is the meaning of science? It
is, as Hans Primas wrote somewhere,
a tacit assumption of all engineering sciences
that nature can be manipulated and that the ini-
tial conditions required by experiments can be
brought about by interventions of the world ex-
ternal to the object under investigation. That
is, we assume that the experimenter has a cer-
tain freedom of action which is not accounted for
by first principles of physics. Without this free-
dom of choice, experiments would be impossible.
Man’s free will implies the ability to carry out
actions, it constitutes his essence as an actor.
We act under the idea of freedom, but the topic
under discussion is neither man’s sense of per-
sonal freedom as a subjective experience, nor the
question whether this idea could be an illusion
or not, nor any questions of moral philosophy,
but that the framework of experimental science
requires the freedom of action as a constitutive
though tacit presupposition.
If the left-hand system can manipulate the right-hand
system, even when by assumption it cannot, then who is
to say that the right-hand system cannot manipulate the
agent himself?28 It would be a wackier world than even
the one QBism entertains.
But QBism’s world is not such a bad world, and some
of us find its openness to possibility immensely exciting.
What gives way in this world is simply the EPR criterion
of reality: Both the idea that a probability-one assign-
ment implies there is a pre-existent outcome (property)
28To put it still differently: If one is never allowed to assume
causal independence between separated systems because of a
contradiction in the term, then one can never assume it of
oneself either, even with respect to the components of the
world one thinks one is manipulating.
“over there” waiting to be revealed and, baring that, that
it must have been “over here” pre-existent, waiting to be
transferred and then revealed. The solution lies closer to
one of John Wheeler’s quips, “No question? No answer.”
A probability-one assignment lays no necessary claim on
what the world is,29 but what the agent using it believes
with all his heart and soul. In the case of our present
example, what the agent believes is that if an outcome b
came about as a result of his action H on the left-hand
system, an outcome b would come about if he were to
perform the action HT on the right-hand system. But if
he does not walk over to the right-hand system and take
the action, there is no good sense in which the outcome
(or property) b is already there.
29The author believes the opposing opinion on this point is
the root of all trouble in arguments claiming to show that
Bell inequality violations imply nonlocality, full stop. Like
a clerk at a patent office receiving another proposal for a
perpetuum mobile, the Quantum Bayesian always has to find
the singular flawed mechanism that lurks behind the claim—
sometimes it is not easy—but it is always there, no matter
how sophisticated the argument. One finds oneself thankful
for the very clearest papers on the subject, for they practically
lay the point on a tray. A good example is Travis Norsen’s
presentation [53], where it is written:
“. . . a statement of the form . . . implies one of the
form
P (A = −1|nˆ1, λ) = 1
since the outcomes are bivalent: if, for a given
[hidden-variable state] λ and a given measurement di-
rection [nˆ1], a certain outcome is (according to some
theory) impossible, then, since there are only two pos-
sible outcomes, the opposite outcome is required. . . .
This suggests a shorthand notation in which we sub-
stitute . . . the simpler statement
A(nˆ1, λ) = −1
The reader may worry that we are here violating
Wheeler’s famous statement of the orthodox quantum
philosophy . . . i.e., it is invalid to attribute particular
outcomes to experiments which haven’t, in fact, been
performed. This worry is partly justified. We are not,
however, asserting that an un-performed measure-
ment has an actual, particular outcome; this would be
literal nonsense, and is the grain of truth in Wheeler’s
dictum. Strictly speaking, our statement isn’t even
about Alice’s measurement – it is about the state λ
and the theory in which that state assignment is em-
bedded. The real meaning of [the last equation above]
is simply this: for the state λ, the theory in question
assigns unit probability to the outcome A = −1 un-
der the condition that Alice measures along direction
nˆ1. The theory must attribute sufficient structure to
λ (and possess the necessary dynamical laws) such
that, should Alice choose to measure along nˆ1, the
outcome A = −1 is guaranteed. In this sense, we
may say that the theory in question encodes the out-
come A = −1 (for measurement along nˆ1) in the state
λ.”
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At the instigation of a quantum measurement, some-
thing new comes into the world that was not there before;
and that is about as clear an instance of creation as one
can imagine. Sometimes one will have no strong beliefs
for what will result from the creation (as with the mea-
surement of H), and sometimes one will have very strong
beliefs (as with the subsequent measurement ofHT ), but
a free creation of nature it remains.
VI. HILBERT-SPACE DIMENSION AS A
UNIVERSAL CAPACITY
It is entirely possible to conceive of a world com-
posed of individual atoms, each as different from
one another as one organism is from the next.
— John Dupre´
A common accusation heard by the Quantum Bayesian
is that the view leads straight away to solipsism, “the be-
lief that all reality is just one’s imagining of reality, and
that one’s self is the only thing that exists.”30 The accu-
sation goes that, if a quantum state |ψ〉 only represents
the degrees of belief held by some agent—say, the one
portrayed in Figure 1—then the agent’s beliefs must be
the source of the universe. The universe could not exist
without him: This being such a ridiculous idea, QBism
is dismissed out of hand, reductio ad absurdum. It is
so hard for the QBist to understand how anyone could
think this (it being the antithesis of everything in his
worldview) that a little of our own Latin comes to mind:
non sequitur. See Figure 5.
A fairer-minded assessment is that the accusation
springs from our opponents “hearing” much of what we
do say, but interpreting it in terms drawn from a partic-
ular conception of what physical theories always ought to
be: Attempts to directly represent (map, picture, copy,
correspond to, correlate with) the universe—with “uni-
verse” here thought of in totality as a pre-existing, static
system; an unchanging, monistic something that just is.
From such a “representationalist” point of view, if a)
quantum theory is a proper physical theory, b) its essen-
tial theoretical objects are quantum states, and c) quan-
tum states are states of belief, then the universe that
30This is the definition of The American Heritage New Dic-
tionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition (2005). Ency-
clopedia Brittanica (2008) expands, “in philosophy . . . the
extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the hu-
man mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence
of anything but itself. The British idealist F. H. Bradley, in
Appearance and Reality (1897), characterized the solipsistic
view as follows: ‘I cannot transcend experience, and expe-
rience is my experience. From this it follows that nothing
beyond myself exists; for what is experience is its (the self’s)
states.’ ”
“just is” corresponds to a state of belief. Solipsism on a
stick, one might say.31
FIG. 5. Sarcasm. In a lecture bottlenecked by repeated
accusations of Quantum Bayesianism’s solipsism, the author
sometimes uses the following technique to move things along.
Referring to the previous Figure 1, he asks the stubborn ac-
cuser, “What about this diagram do you not get? It shows
an agent and a physical system external to him. It says that
a quantum state is a state of belief about what will come
about as a consequence of his actions upon the system. The
quantum state is not a state of nature, but so what? There
is an agent with his belief; there is a system that is not part
of him; and there is something that really, eventually comes
about—it is called the outcome. No agent, no outcome for
sure, but that’s not solipsism: For, no system, no outcome
either! A quantum measurement without an external system
participating would be like the sound of one hand clapping, a
Zen koan. If we were really expressing solipsism, wouldn’t a
diagram like the one above be more appropriate? A big eye-
ball surveying nothing. Now there’s really no external system
and nothing to act upon. That’s solipsism.”
Quantum Bayesianism sidesteps the poisoned dart, as
the previous sections have tried to convey, by asserting
that quantum theory is just not a physical theory in the
sense the accusers want it to be. Rather it is an addi-
tion to personal, Bayesian, normative probability theory.
Its normative rules for connecting probabilities (personal
judgments) were developed in light of the character of
the world, but there is no sense in which the quantum
state itself represents (pictures, copies, corresponds to,
correlates with) a part or a whole of the external world,
much less a world that just is. In fact the very char-
acter of the theory seems to point to the inadequacy of
the representationalist program when attempted on the
particular world we live in.
There are no lofty philosophical arguments here
that representationalism must be wrong always and in
31See http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term
=on+a+stick if you have any doubt of the meaning.
all possible worlds (perhaps because of some internal
inconsistency32). Representationalism may well be true
in this or that setting—we take no stand on the mat-
ter. We only know that for nearly 90 years quantum
theory has been actively resistant to representationalist
efforts on its behalf. This suggests that it might be worth
exploring some philosophies upon which physics rarely
sets foot. Physics of course should never be constrained
by any one philosophy (history shows it nearly always
lethal), but it does not hurt to get ideas and insights
from every source one can. If one were to sweep the philo-
sophical literature for schools of thought representative of
what QBism actually is about, it is not solipsism one will
find, but nonreductionism [63,64], (radical) metaphysical
pluralism [65,66], empiricism [67,68], indeterminism and
meliorism33 [69], and above all pragmatism [70,71].
A form of nonreductionism can already be seen in play
in our answer to whether the notion of agent should be
derivable from the quantum formalism itself. We say that
it cannot be and it should not be, and to believe other-
wise is to misunderstand the subject matter of quantum
theory. But nonreductionism also goes hand in hand
with the idea that there is real particularity and “in-
teriority” in the world. Think again of the “I-I-me-me
mine” feature that shields QBism from inconsistency in
the “Wigner’s friend” scenario. When Wigner turns his
back to his friend’s interaction with the system, that
piece of reality—Bohr might call it a “phenomenon”34—
32As [62] might try to argue.
33Strictly speaking, meliorism is the doctrine “that humans
can, through their interference with processes that would oth-
erwise be natural, produce an outcome which is an improve-
ment over the aforementioned natural one.” But we would
be reluctant to take a stand on what “improvement” really
means. So said, all we mean in the present essay by melior-
ism is that the world before the agent is malleable to some
extent—that his actions really can change it. Adam said to
God, “I want the ability to write messages onto the world.”
God replied, “You ask much of me. If you want to write upon
the world, it cannot be so rigid a thing as I had originally
intended. The world would have to have some malleability,
with enough looseness for you to write upon its properties.
It will make your world more unpredictable than it would
have been—I may not be able to warn you about impend-
ing dangers like droughts and hurricanes as effectively as I
could have—but I can make it such if you want.” And with
that Adam brought all host of uncertainties to his life, but he
gained a world where his deeds and actions mattered.
34With the mention of Bohr’s beloved “phenomenon,” the
author atones for the sin explained in Footnote 2. That said,
we stress the word might. Here is the way H. J. Folse [72]
explains Bohr’s conception of the word:
Bohr repeatedly stressed that the break between
classical and quantum physics, resides in the fact that
‘Planck’s discovery of the elementary quantum of ac-
tion . . . revealed a feature of wholeness inherent in
is hermetically sealed from him. It has an inside, a vital-
ity that he takes no part in until he again interacts with
one or both relevant pieces of it. With respect to Wigner,
it is a bit like a universe unto itself.35
If one seeks the essence of indeterminism in quantum
mechanics, there may be no example more directly illus-
trative of it than “Wigner’s friend.” For it expresses to
a tee William James’s notion of indeterminism [69]:
[Chance] is a purely negative and relative
term, giving us no information about that of
which it is predicated, except that it happens to
be disconnected with something else—not con-
trolled, secured, or necessitated by other things
in advance of its own actual presence. . . . What I
say is that it tells us nothing about what a thing
may be in itself to call it “chance.” . . . All you
mean by calling it “chance” is that this is not
guaranteed, that it may also fall out otherwise.
For the system of other things has no positive
hold on the chance-thing. Its origin is in a cer-
tain fashion negative: it escapes, and says, Hands
off! coming, when it comes, as a free gift, or not
at all.
This negativeness, however, and this opacity
of the chance-thing when thus considered ab ex-
tra, or from the point of view of previous things
or distant things, do not preclude its having
atomic processes, going far beyond the ancient idea of
the limited divisibility of matter.’ The consequence of
adopting the quantization of action in physics is that
in the fine structure of the physical world it is these
causal processes of interaction, not bits of material
substances, which are ‘atomized’—i.e. made ‘indivisi-
ble.’ The ‘atomicity of an interaction’ implies that the
description of an ‘observation’ of a microsystem which
must subdivide the whole interaction into separate
observed and observing systems is a conceptual ideal-
ization or ‘abstraction’ employed for interpreting the
observation, but not a ‘picture’ of an objective course
of events. On Bohr’s concept of reality we individuate
the parts of the world not qua spatio-temporally ‘sep-
arable’ physical systems possessing properties apart
from any interaction, but instead qua ‘individual’ in-
teractions each of which is a whole phenomenon the
description and prediction of which must be the goal
of a successful physical theory.
35Would it be a universe unto itself with respect to you the
reader? I cannot say: It would depend upon your quantum
state for the friend and system, and that might have nothing
to do with Wigner’s. But it depends upon even more than
that. For you might surmise the friend to be in contact with
physical systems Wigner never even dreamed of. That is, you
may not assign the same relevant systems as Wigner—your
assignment might not be bipartite, but multipartite. When
one deems quantum states personalist Bayesian assignments,
all these options must be taken seriously and savored for the
lessons they teach.
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any amount of positiveness and luminosity from
within, and at its own place and moment. All
that its chance-character asserts about it is that
there is something in it really of its own, some-
thing that is not the unconditional property of
the whole. If the whole wants this property, the
whole must wait till it can get it, if it be a matter
of chance. That the universe may actually be a
sort of joint-stock society of this sort, in which
the sharers have both limited liabilities and lim-
ited powers, is of course a simple and conceivable
notion.
And once again [73],
Why may not the world be a sort of republi-
can banquet of this sort, where all the qualities of
being respect one another’s personal sacredness,
yet sit at the common table of space and time?
To me this view seems deeply probable.
Things cohere, but the act of cohesion itself im-
plies but few conditions, and leaves the rest of
their qualifications indeterminate. As the first
three notes of a tune comport many endings, all
melodious, but the tune is not named till a partic-
ular ending has actually come,—so the parts ac-
tually known of the universe may comport many
ideally possible complements. But as the facts
are not the complements, so the knowledge of the
one is not the knowledge of the other in anything
but the few necessary elements of which all must
partake in order to be together at all. Why, if one
act of knowledge could from one point take in the
total perspective, with all mere possibilities abol-
ished, should there ever have been anything more
than that act? Why duplicate it by the tedious
unrolling, inch by inch, of the foredone reality?
No answer seems possible. On the other hand,
if we stipulate only a partial community of par-
tially independent powers, we see perfectly why
no one part controls the whole view, but each de-
tail must come and be actually given, before, in
any special sense, it can be said to be determined
at all. This is the moral view, the view that gives
to other powers the same freedom it would have
itself.
The train of (still loose, but slowly firming) logic back
to QBism is this. If James and our analysis of “Wigner’s
friend” are right, the universe is not one in a very rigid
sense, but rather more truly a pluriverse.36 To get some
36The term “pluriverse” is again a Jamesian one. He used
it interchangeably with the word “multiverse,” which he also
invented. Unfortunately the latter has been coopted by the
Everettian movement for their own—in the end monistic—
purposes: “The world is one; it is the deterministically evolv-
ing universal quantum state, the ‘multiverse’.” Too bad. Mul-
sense of what this can mean, it is useful to start by think-
ing about what it is not. A good example can be found
by taking a solution to the vacuum Maxwell equations
in some extended region of spacetime. Focus on a com-
pact subregion and try to conceptually delete the solution
within it, reconstructing it with some new set of values.
It can’t be done. The fields outside the region (includ-
ing the boundary) uniquely determine the fields inside it.
The interior of the region has no identity but that dic-
tated by the rest of the world—it has no “interiority” of
its own. The pluriverse conception says we’ll have none of
that. And so, for any agent immersed in this world there
will always be uncertainty for what will happen upon his
encounters with it. To wit, where there is uncertainty
there should be Bayesian probabilities, and so on and so
on until much of the story we have already told.
What all this hints is that for QBism the proper way
to think of our world is as the empiricist or radical meta-
physical pluralist does. Let us launch into making this
clearer, for that process more than anything will explain
how QBism hopes to interpret Hilbert-space dimension.
The metaphysics of empiricism can be put like this.
Everything experienced, everything experienceable37,
has no less an ontological status than anything else. You
tell me of your experience, and I will say it is real, even a
distinguished part of reality. A child awakens in the mid-
dle of the night frightened that there is a monster under
her bed, one soon to reach up and steal her arm—that
we-would-call-imaginary experience38 has no less a hold
tiverse is a tempting word, but we stick with pluriverse to
avoid any confusion with the Everettian usage.
37That is, every piece of the universe had better be hard-
wired for the contingency that an agent might experience it
somewhere, somehow, no matter how long and drawn out
the ultimate chain might be to such a potential experience.
Does this mean even “elementary” physical events just after
the Big Bang must make use of concepts that, to the reduc-
tionist mind, ought to be 15 billion years removed down the
evolutionary chain? You bet it does. But a nonreductionist
metaphysic need make no apology for this—such things are in
the very idea. John Wheeler’s great smoky dragon [74] comes
into the world biting its own tail.
W. K. Wootters tells a lovely story of an encounter he had
several years ago of with his young son Nate. Nate said, “I
wish I could make this flower move with my mind.” Wootters
reached out and pushed the flower, saying, “You can. You do
it like this.” From the perspective here, this is an example
of an interaction between two nonreductionist realms. Each
realm influences the other as its turn comes. There is a kind
of reciprocality in this, an action-reaction principle, that most
reductionist visions of the world would find obscene.
38There is indeed no doubt that it should be called imagi-
nary! That, however, is a statement about the experience’s
meaning and interpretation, not its existence. The experience
as it is exists, period. It is what it is. Like the biblical burn-
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on onticity than a Higgs-boson detection event would if
it were to occur at the fully operational LHC. They are
of equal status from this point of view—they are equal
elements in the filling out and making of reality. This is
because the world of the empiricist is not a sparse world
like the world of Democritus (nothing but atom and void)
or Einstein (nothing but unchanging spacetime manifold
equipped with this or that field), but a world overflow-
ingly full of variety—a world whose details are beyond
anything grammatical (rule-bound) expression can artic-
ulate.
Yet this is no statement that physics should give up,
or that physics has no real role in coming to grips with
the world. It is only a statement that physics should
better understand its function. What is being aimed for
here finds its crispest, clearest contrast in a statement
Richard Feynman once made [75]:
If, in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowl-
edge were to be destroyed, and only one sentence
passed on to the next generation of creatures,
what statement would contain the most informa-
tion in the fewest words? I believe it is the atomic
hypothesis (or the atomic fact) that all things are
made of atoms—little particles that move around
in perpetual motion, attracting each other when
they are a little distance apart, but repelling
upon being squeezed into one another. . . .
Everything is made of atoms. That is the key
hypothesis.
The issue for QBism hangs on the imagery that usually
lies behind the phrase “everything is made of.” William
James called it the great original sin of the rationalistic
mind [76]:
Let me give the name of ‘vicious abstraction-
ism’ to a way of using concepts which may be
thus described: We conceive a concrete situation
by singling out some salient or important feature
in it, and classing it under that; then, instead of
adding to its previous characters all the positive
consequences which the new way of conceiving it
may bring, we proceed to use our concept priva-
tively; reducing the originally rich phenomenon
to the naked suggestions of that name abstractly
taken, treating it as a case of ‘nothing but’ that,
concept, and acting as if all the other charac-
ters from out of which the concept is abstracted
were expunged. Abstraction, functioning in this
ing bush, each experience declares, “I am that I am.” Most
likely in the present example, the experience will be a little
piece of the universe isolated, on its own, and of no great
consequence. But one never knows until all future plays out.
Some lucky dreams have built nations. Maybe the same is
true of some lucky Higgs-boson events. Most though, surely,
will be of the more minor fabric of existence.
way, becomes a means of arrest far more than
a means of advance in thought. It mutilates
things; it creates difficulties and finds impossibil-
ities; and more than half the trouble that meta-
physicians and logicians give themselves over the
paradoxes and dialectic puzzles of the universe
may, I am convinced, be traced to this relatively
simple source. The viciously privative employ-
ment of abstract characters and class names is,
I am persuaded, one of the great original sins of
the rationalistic mind.
What is being realized through QBism’s peculiar way of
looking at things is that physics actually can be done
without any accompanying vicious abstractionism. You
do physics as you have always done it, but you throw
away the idea “everything is made of [Essence X]” before
even starting.
Physics—in the right mindset—is not about identify-
ing the bricks with which nature is made, but about iden-
tifying what is common to the largest range of phenom-
ena it can get its hands on. The idea is not difficult
once one gets used to thinking in these terms. Carbon?
The old answer would go that it is nothing but a build-
ing block that combines with other elements according
to the following rules, blah, blah, blah. The new answer
is that carbon is a characteristic common to diamonds,
pencil leads, deoxyribonucleic acid, burnt pancakes, the
space between stars, the emissions of Ford pick-up trucks,
and so on—the list is as unending as the world is itself.
For, carbon is also a characteristic common to this dia-
mond and this diamond and this diamond and this. But
a flawless diamond and a purified zirconium crystal, no
matter how carefully crafted, have no such characteristic
in common: Carbon is not a universal characteristic of
all phenomena. The aim of physics is to find character-
istics that apply to as much of the world in its varied
fullness as possible. However, those common character-
istics are hardly what the world is made of—the world
instead is made of this and this and this. The world is
constructed of every particular there is and every way of
carving up every particular there is.
An unparalleled example of how physics operates in
such a world can be found by looking to Newton’s law
of universal gravitation. What did Newton really find?
Would he be considered a great physicist in this day when
every news magazine presents the most cherished goal of
physics to be a Theory of Everything? For the law of uni-
versal gravitation is hardly that! Instead, it merely says
that every body in the universe tries to accelerate ev-
ery other body toward itself at a rate proportional to its
own mass and inversely proportional to the squared dis-
tance between them. Beyond that, the law says nothing
else particular of objects, and it would have been a rare
thinker in Newton’s time, if any at all, who would have
imagined that all the complexities of the world could be
derived from that limited law. Yet there is no doubt that
Newton was one of the greatest physicists of all time. He
did not give a theory of everything, but a Theory of One
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Aspect of Everything. And only the tiniest fraction of
physicists of any variety, much less the TOE-seeking va-
riety, have ever worn a badge of that more modest kind.
It is as H. C. von Baeyer wrote in one of his books [77],
Great revolutionaries don’t stop at half measures
if they can go all the way. For Newton this meant
an almost unimaginable widening of the scope of
his new-found law. Not only Earth, Sun, and
planets attract objects in their vicinity, he con-
jectured, but all objects, no matter how large or
small, attract all other objects, no matter how far
distant. It was a proposition of almost reckless
boldness, and it changed the way we perceive the
world.
Finding a theory of “merely” one aspect of everything
is hardly something to be ashamed of: It is the loftiest
achievement physics can have in a living, breathing non-
reductionist world.
Which leads us back to Hilbert space. Quantum
theory—that user’s manual for decision-making agents
immersed in a world of some yet to be fully identified
character—makes a statement about the world to the ex-
tent that it identifies a quality common to all the world’s
pieces. QBism says the quantum state is not one of
those qualities. But of Hilbert spaces themselves, par-
ticularly their distinguishing characteristic one from the
other, dimension,39 QBism carries no such grudge. Di-
mension is something one posits for a body or a piece
of the world, much like one posits a mass for it in the
Newtonian theory. Dimension is something a body holds
all by itself, regardless of what an agent thinks of it.
That this is so can be seen already from reasons inter-
nal to the theory. Just think of all the arguments rounded
up for making the case that quantum states should be in-
terpreted as of the character of Bayesian degrees of belief.
None of these work for Hilbert-space dimension. Take
one example, an old favorite—Einstein’s argument about
conditioning quantum states from afar. In Section V of
this paper we repeated the argument verbatim, but it is
relevant to note that before Einstein could write down his
ψ12, he would have had to associate some Hilbert spaces
H1 and H2 with S1 and S2 and take their tensor product
H1 ⊗ H2. Suppose the dimensionalities of these spaces
to be d1 and d2, respectively. The question is, is there
anything similar to Einstein’s argument for changing the
value of d2 from a distance? There isn’t. ψ2 may be
39Hardy [83,84] and Dakic´ and Brukner [85] are examples of
foundational efforts that also emphasize this quantum analog
to what Eo¨tvo¨s tested on platinum and copper [78]. Hardy
put it this way in one of his axioms, “There exist systems for
which N = 1, 2, · · ·, and, furthermore, all systems of dimen-
sion N , or systems of higher dimension but where the state
is constrained to an N dimensional subspace, have the same
properties.”
forced into this or that subspace by choosing the appro-
priate measurement on S1, but there is no question of
the whole Hilbert space H2 remaining intact. When it is
time to measure S2 itself, one will still have the full ar-
senal of quantum measurements appropriate to a Hilbert
space of dimension d2 to choose from—none of those fall
by the wayside. In Einstein’s terms, d2 is part of the
“real factual situation” of S2.
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The claim here is that quantum mechanics, when it
came into existence, implicitly recognized a previously
unnoticed capacity inherent in all matter—call it quan-
tum dimension. In one manifestation, it is the fuel upon
which quantum computation runs [78,79]. In another
it is the raw irritability of a quantum system to being
eavesdropped upon [36,80]. In Eq. (8) it was a measure
of deviation from the Law of Total Probability induced
by counterfactual thinking. And in a farther-fetched sce-
nario to which we will come back, its logarithm might
just manifest itself as the squared gravitational mass of
a Schwarzschild black hole [81,82].
When quantum mechanics was discovered, something
was added to matter in our conception of it. Think of
the apple that inspired Newton to his law. With its dis-
covery the color, taste, and texture of the apple didn’t
disappear; the law of universal gravitation didn’t reduce
the apple privatively to just gravitational mass. Instead,
the apple was at least everything it was before, but after-
ward even more—for instance, it became known to have
something in common with the moon. A modern-day
Cavendish would be able to literally measure the further
attraction an apple imparts to a child already hungry
to pick it from the tree. So similarly with Hilbert-space
dimension. Those diamonds we have already used to il-
lustrate the idea of nonreductionism, in very careful con-
ditions, could be used as components in a quantum com-
puter [89]. Diamonds have among their many properties
something not envisioned before quantum mechanics—
that they could be a source of relatively accessible Hilbert
space dimension and as such have this much in common
with any number of other proposed implementations of
quantum computing. Diamonds not only have something
in common with the moon, but now with the ion-trap
quantum-computer prototypes around the world.
Diamondness is not something to be derived from
quantum mechanics. It is that quantum mechanics is
something we add to the repertoire of things we already
say of diamonds, to the things we do with them and
the ways we admire them. This is a very powerful re-
alization: For diamonds already valuable, become ever
more so as their qualities compound. And saying more
of them, not less of them as is the goal of all reduction-
40Most recently techniques have started to become available
to “test” the supposition of a dimension against one’s broader
mesh of beliefs; see [86–88].
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ism, has the power to suggest all kinds of variations on
the theme. For instance, thinking in quantum mechan-
ical terms might suggest a technique for making “purer
diamonds.” Though to an empiricist this phrase means
not at all what it means to a reductionist. It means that
these similar things called diamonds can suggest exotic
variations of the original objects with various pinpointed
properties this way or that. Purer diamond is notmore of
what it already was in nature. It is a new species, with
traits of its parents to be sure, but nonetheless stand-
alone, like a new breed of dog.
To put it still differently, and now in the metaphor of
music, a jazz musician might declare that a tune once
heard thereafter plays its most crucial role as a substrate
for something new. It is the fleeting solid ground upon
which something new can be born. The seven tracks ti-
tled Salt Peanuts in my mp3 player41 are moments of
novelty in the universe never to be recreated. So of di-
amonds, and so of all this quantum world. Or at least
that is the path QBism seems to indicate.42
To the reductionist, of course, this seems exactly back-
wards. But then, it is the reductionist who must live with
a seemingly infinite supply of conundrums arising from
quantum mechanics. It is the reductionist who must live
in a state of arrest, rather than moving on to the next
stage of physics. Take a problem that has been a large
theme of the quantum foundations meetings for the last
30 years. To put it in a commonly heard question, “Why
does the world look classical if it actually operates ac-
cording to quantum mechanics?” The touted mystery is
that we never “see” quantum superposition and entan-
glement in our everyday experience.43
The real issue is this. The expectation of the quantum-
to-classical transitionists44 is that quantum theory is at
the bottom of things, and “the classical world of our ex-
perience” is something to be derived out of it. QBism
says “No. Experience is neither classical nor quantum.
Experience is experience with a richness that classical
physics of any variety could not remotely grasp.” Quan-
tum mechanics is something put on top of raw, unre-
flected experience. It is additive to it, suggesting wholly
new types of experience, while never invalidating the old.
To the question, “Why has no one ever seen superpo-
sition or entanglement in diamond before?,” the QBist
replies: It is simply because before recent technologies
41Charlie Parker, Dizzy Gillespie, Charlie Parker, Charlie
Parker, Charlie Parker, Joshua Redman, Miles Davis Quintet.
42A nice logical argument for this can be found in [90].
43Of course, to a group of personalist Bayesians that’s like
asking, “Which of you has ever seen a probability distribu-
tion?” Not a one will say yes. Probabilities in personalist
Bayesianism are not the sorts of things that can be seen; they
are the things that are thought. It is events that are seen.
But let us drop the matter for the moment.
44See [91,92] for particularly clear discussions of the subject.
and very controlled conditions, as well as lots of refined
analysis and thinking, no one had ever mustered a mesh
of beliefs relevant to such a range of interactions (fac-
tual and counterfactual) with diamonds. No one had
ever been in a position to adopt the extra normative con-
straints required by the Born Rule. For QBism, it is not
the emergence of classicality that needs to be explained,
but the emergence of our new ways of manipulating, con-
trolling, and interacting with matter that do.
In this sense, QBism declares the quantum-to-
classical research program unnecessary (and actually
obstructive45) in a way not so dissimilar to the way
Bohr’s 1913 model of the hydrogen atom declared
another research program unnecessary (and actually
obstructive).46 Bohr’s great achievement above all the
45Without an ontic understanding of quantum states, quan-
tum operations, and unitary time evolutions—all of which
QBism rejects, see Footnote 22 and Refs. [2,5,20]—how can
the project even get off the ground? As one can ask of the
Big Bang, “What banged?,” the QBist must ask, “In those
days of the world before agents using quantum theory, what
decohered?”
46All is not lost, however, for the scores of decoherentists
this policy would unforgivingly unemploy. For it only sug-
gests that they redirect their work to the opposite direction.
The thing that needs insight is not the quantum-to-classical
transition, but the classical-to-quantum! The burning ques-
tion for the QBist is how to model in Hilbert-space terms the
common sorts of measurements we perform just by opening
our eyes, cupping our ears, and extending our fingers.
Take a professional baseball player watching a ball fly to-
ward him: He puts his whole life into when and how he should
swing his bat. But what does this mean in terms of the im-
mense Hilbert space a quantum theoretical description would
associate with the ball? Surely the player has an intuitive
sense of both the instantaneous position and instantaneous
momentum of the baseball before he lays his swing into it—
that’s what “keeping his eye on the ball” means. Indeed it
is from this intuition that Newton was able to lay down his
laws of classical mechanics. Yet, what can it mean to say this
given quantum theory’s prohibition of simultaneously mea-
suring complementary observables? It means that whatever
the baseball player is measuring, it ain’t that—it ain’t po-
sition and momentum as usually written in operator terms.
Instead, a quantum model of what he is doing would be some
interesting, far-from-extremal single POVM—perhaps even
one that takes into account some information that does not
properly live within the formal structure of quantum theory
(the larger arena that Howard Barnum calls “meaty quantum
physics” [93]). For instance, that an eigenvector |i〉 of some
Hermitian operator, though identically orthogonal to fellow
eigenvectors |j〉 and |k〉 in the Hilbert-space sense, might be
closer in meaning to |k〉 than to |j〉 for some issue at hand.
So the question becomes how to take a given common-day
measurement procedure and add to it a consistent quantum
description? The original procedure was stand alone—it can
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other physicists of his day was in being the first to say,
“Enough! I shall not give a mechanistic explanation for
these spectra we see. Here is a way to think of them with
no mechanism.” The important question is how matter
can be coaxed to do new things. It is in the ways the
world yields to our desires, and the ways it refuses to,
that we learn the depths of its character.
I give you an object of this much gravitational
mass. What can you do with it? What can
you not? And when you are not about, what
does it cause?
I give you an object of this much quantum dim-
ension. What can you do with it? What can
you not? And when you are not about, what
does it cause?
If taken seriously what do these questions imply by
their very existence? That they should have meaning-
ful answers! Here is one example. A knee-jerk reaction
in many physicists upon hearing these things is to de-
clare that dimension as a capacity collapses to a triviality
as soon as it is spoken. “All real-world systems possess
infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. And it doesn’t take
quantum field theory to be completely correct to make
that true; a simple one-dimensional harmonic oscillator
will do. It has an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.”
But maybe not. Maybe no real-world quantum system
has that much oomph. Just as one can treat the Earth’s
inertial mass as infinite for many a freshman mechanics
problem, or a heat bath as infinite for many a thermody-
namical one, maybe this is all that has ever been going
on with infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. It is a use-
ful artifice when a problem can be economically handled
with a differential equation. (Ask Schro¨dinger.)
And with this, we come to nearly the farthest edge of
QBism. It is the beginning of a place where quantum
mechanics must step past itself. To make quantum di-
mension meaningful in ontic terms, as a quality common
to all physical objects, is to say it should be finite—going
up, going down from this object to the next, but always
finite. Every region of space where electromagnetism can
propagate, finite. Every region of space where there is a
gravitational “field,” finite.
It means that despite its humble roots in nonrelativis-
tic quantum mechanics, there is something already cos-
mological about QBism. It tinkers with spacetime, say-
ing that in every “hole” (every bounded region) there is
an interiority not given by the rest of the universe and a
live without a quantum description of it—but if one wants
to move it to a new level or new direction, having added a
consistent quantum description will be most helpful to those
ends. Work along these lines is nascent, but already some ex-
cellent examples exist. See [94]. Of course, unconsciously it is
what has been happening since the founding days of quantum
mechanics.
common quality called dimension. It says that there is
probably something right about the holographic princi-
ples arising from other reaches of physics [95]. But also
Quantum Bayesianism, recognizing entropy as a personal
concept (entropy is a function of probability), would sus-
pect that it is not an entropy bound that arises from these
principles. Would it be a dimension bound? And why
so, if there were not a new equivalence principle lurking
around the corner [78,96]?
VII. QUANTUM COSMOLOGY FROM THE
INSIDE
Let us, however, step back from that farthest edge for
a moment and discuss cosmology as it is presently con-
strued before taking that final leap!
FIG. 6. Quantum Cosmology from the Inside. The
agent in Figure 1 can consider measurements on ever larger
systems. There is nothing in quantum mechanics to bar the
systems considered from being larger and larger, to the point
of eventually surrounding the agent. Pushed far enough, this
is quantum cosmology! Why all this insistence on thinking
that “an agent must be outside the system he measures” in
the cosmological context should mean “outside the physical
universe itself”? It means outside the system of interest, and
that is the large-scale universe. Nor is there any issue of
self-reference at hand. One would be hard pressed to find a
cosmologist who wants to include his beliefs about how the
beats of his heart correlate with the sidereal cycles in his quan-
tum-state assignment for the external universe. The symbol
|Ψuniverse 〉 refers to the green boxes alone.
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Sometimes it is claimed that a point of view about
quantum theory like QBism’s would make the enquiries
of quantum cosmology impossible. For instance, David
Deutsch once put it like this [97]:
The best physical reason for adopting the
Everett interpretation lies in quantum cosmol-
ogy. There one tries to apply quantum theory
to the universe as a whole, considering the uni-
verse as a dynamical object starting with a big
bang, evolving to form galaxies and so on. Then
when one tries, for example by looking in a text-
book, to ask what the symbols in the quantum
theory mean, how does one use the wave func-
tion of the universe and the other mathemati-
cal objects that quantum theory employs to de-
scribe reality? One reads there, ‘The meaning
of these mathematical objects is as follows: first
consider an observer outside the quantum sys-
tem under consideration . . . .’ And immediately
one has to stop short. Postulating an outside ob-
server is all very well when we’re talking about
a laboratory: we can imagine an observer sitting
outside the experimental apparatus looking at it,
but when the experimental apparatus—the ob-
ject being described by quantum theory—is the
entire universe, it’s logically inconsistent to imag-
ine an observer sitting outside it. Therefore the
standard interpretation fails. It fails completely
to describe quantum cosmology. Even if we knew
how to write down the theory of quantum cosmol-
ogy, which is quite hard incidentally, we literally
wouldn’t know what the symbols meant under
any interpretation other than the Everett inter-
pretation.
But this is nonsense. It is not hard to imagine how to
measure the universe as a whole: You simply live in it.
What are the typical observables and predictables of
cosmology? The Hubble constant, the cosmological con-
stant, the degree of inhomogeneity of the cosmic mi-
crowave background radiation, total baryon number in
this or that era of the universe, perhaps others. To do
quantum cosmology is to ask how an application of quan-
tum mechanics can be made with regard to these quanti-
ties. For the Quantum Bayesian quantum theory would
be used as it always is: As a normative calculus of consis-
tency for all probability assignments concerned. Quan-
tum theory advises an agent to make all his probability
assignments derivable from a single quantum state. Write
it like this if you wish:
|Ψuniverse 〉 (18)
why not?47 We are swimming in this ocean called the
universe, and we have to do physics from inside of it.
47Well, there is a reason why not. One doesn’t even write
But then all the rest of the universe is outside each of
us. Eq. (18) represent an agent’s catalog of beliefs for
the relevant things outside.
The only point here is that QBism has every bit as
much right to do cosmology as any other crazy interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. The only difference is that
QBism does it from the inside.
More exciting is the possibility that once it does all
that (its own version of what the other interpretations
might have done), its power may not be exhausted. For,
noting how the Big Bang itself is a moment of creation
with some resemblance to every individual quantum mea-
surement, one starts to wonder whether even it “might
be on the inside.” Certainly QBism has creation going
on all the time and everywhere; quantum measurement
is just about an agent hitching a ride and partaking in
that ubiquitous process.
At the end of a long article it doesn’t hurt to speculate.
We let William James and John Archibald Wheeler do
the work for us. First more sweepingly [99],
Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem
to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the
parts of the world to which we are closest, the
parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate
and complete. Why should we not take them
at their facevalue? Why may they not be the
actual turning-places and growing-places which
they seem to be, of the world—why not the work-
shop of being, where we catch fact in the making,
so that nowhere may the world grow in any other
kind of way than this?
Irrational! we are told. How can new being
come in local spots and patches which add them-
selves or stay away at random, independently
of the rest? There must be a reason for our
acts, and where in the last resort can any rea-
son be looked for save in the material pressure
or the logical compulsion of the total nature of
the world? There can be but one real agent of
growth, or seeming growth, anywhere, and that
agent is the integral world itself. It may grow
all-over, if growth there be, but that single parts
should grow per se is irrational.
But if one talks of rationality—and of reasons
for things, and insists that they can’t just come in
spots, what kind of a reason can there ultimately
be why anything should come at all?
then more modernly [100],
down a pure quantum state for laser light when its phase is
unknown; a mixed state is more appropriate [98]. It is hard
to imagine why one would write down a pure state for the
large-scale universe. Who would have beliefs that strict of it?
Be that as it may, a pure state is certainly allowed in princi-
ple. Even people with the most unreasonable of initial beliefs
(from one’s own perspective) want to gamble consistently.
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Each elementary quantum phenomenon is an
elementary act of “fact creation.” That is incon-
testable. But is that the only mechanism needed
to create all that is? Is what took place at the
big bang the consequence of billions upon billions
of these elementary processes, these elementary
“acts of observer-participancy,” these quantum
phenomena? Have we had the mechanism of cre-
ation before our eyes all this time without recog-
nizing the truth? That is the larger question im-
plicit in your comment [“Is the big bang here?”].
When cosmology hails from the inside, the world stands
a chance of being anything it wants to be.
VIII. THE FUTURE
It is difficult to escape asking a challenging ques-
tion. Is the entirety of existence, rather than being
built on particles or fields of force or multidimen-
sional geometry, built upon billions upon billions
of elementary quantum phenomena, those elemen-
tary acts of “observer-participancy,” those most
ethereal of all the entities that have been forced
upon us by the progress of science?
— John Archibald Wheeler
There is so much still to do with the physics of QBism;
this article gives no hint. Just one example: The techni-
cal problems with SICs are manifest. For instance, there
must be a reason a proof of their existence has been so
recalcitrant. An optimist would say it is because they
reach so deeply into the core of what the quantum is
telling us! In any case, we do suspect that when we get
the structure of SICs down pat, Eq. (8), though already
so essential to QBism’s distillation of quantum theory’s
message, will seem like child’s play in comparison to the
vistas the further knowledge will open up.
But the technical also complements and motivates the
conceptual. So far we have only given the faintest hint of
how QBism should be mounted onto a larger empiricism.
It will be noticed that QBism has been quite generous
in treating agents as physical objects when needed. “I
contemplate you as an agent when discussing your expe-
rience, but I contemplate you as a physical system before
me when discussing my own.” Our solution to “Wigner’s
friend” is the great example of this. Precisely because of
this, however, QBism knows that its story cannot end as
a story of gambling agents—that is only where it starts.
Agency, for sure, is not a derivable concept as the reduc-
tionists and vicious abstractionists would have it, but
QBism, like all of science, should strive for a Coperni-
can principle whenever possible. We have learned so far
from quantum theory that before an agent the world is
really malleable and ready through their intercourse to
give birth. Why would it not be so for every two parts
of the world? And this newly defined valence, quantum
dimension, might it not be a measure of a system’s po-
tential for creation when it comes into relationship with
those other parts?
It is a large research program whose outline is just tak-
ing shape. It hints of a world, a pluriverse, that consists
of an all-pervading “pure experience,” as William James
called it.48 Expanding this notion, making it technical,
and letting its insights tinker with spacetime itself is the
better part of future work. Quantum states, QBism de-
clares, are not the stuff of the world, but quantum mea-
surement might be. Might a one-day future Shakespeare
write with honesty,
Our revels are now ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are melted into air, into thin air . . .
We are such stuff as
quantum measurement is made on.
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